Team 19 in Vietnam: An Australian Soldier at War

13. Sector Staff Work: The Oil and the Glue: January–April 1969

243 13 Sector Staff Work The Oil and the Glue January–April 1969 I pick up the story from Boxing Day 1968 by way of introduction to the activities of 1969. A coordination meeting was held for a cordon and search operation for the next day. We were informed that “block” was to be the term to use instead of “cordon.” The joint operation had the hallmark of the Stilwell/Truong doctrine. The 1st ARVN Regiment, elements of the 1/5 Infantry Brigade, and sector forces were to participate in the operation. The advisors present at the meeting had an observer role, as we were not to be involved in the operation. Planning was done by committee, with the most persistent voices being the people who influenced the shape of the plan. The discussion took two hours. The operation was uneventful, but a positive note was the experience to be gained by the ARVN and the Territorial Forces in a joint operation of this kind. The GVN forces were being prepared for their future without U.S. support. Later in the day there were further discussions about a fire support coordination center for the area. The main participants were the commanding officer of the 5/4 Artillery (U.S.), the commanding officer of the 11th ARVN Artillery, and Lieutenant Colonel Nhan. Each was in agreement about the idea, and there did not appear to be any technical problems in implementation. The location of the center seemed to be the only matter to be resolved. I had reached a personal view that the 1/5 Infantry Brigade headquarters wanted the center to be in its area, but I judged that the Citadel (sector headquarters ) could finally be decided upon. The hosting issue for an area center continued for about a month. I attended a conference of artillery officers from the 3rd Marine Divi- 244 TEAM 19 IN VIETNAM sion, the 1/5 Mechanized Brigade, and the Quang Tri Combat Base on 27 January. A potential impasse was overcome with a simple and agreed solution. The decision was that the commander responsible for an area of operations, be it at a regiment or brigade level, was to be responsible for fire clearances into or out of the respective areas of operation, and to obtain GVN clearance as well. The sector staff agreed to the procedure, which was really a confirmation of what was a past practice. Sector staff had informed advisors on 31 December 1968 that all of their priority and routine air medical evacuation requests were to be passed to the Hue operations center in order to have the South Vietnamese Air Force more involved in the action. The policy was to apply to Vietnamese medical cases. Vietnamization of the war effort was being introduced in a gradual way.1 I collated the operations procedures manual for the assistant sector advisor to review. Some relief was provided on New Year’s Day when advisory staff available celebrated S4 advisor Major Bernie Meisel’s thirtieth birthday with cheese, biscuits, and beer. On some days advisor operational staffs were committed to tasks away from the center. As key advisor operations center staff were committed elsewhere on 3 January, the center became my place of duty. Fortunately, no challenging issues arose, allowing me the time to familiarize myself with the radio networks and other details within the center. At the next Saturday advisors’ meeting the new police advisor, Mr. Walt Bayling, spent fifteen minutes telling us of the strengths and weaknesses of the police in Quang Tri Province. He related to us highlights of his eight years of service in South Vietnam. Bayling had undertaken a personal inspection of all the districts in the sector and had reached certain conclusions, which I did not record. His performance was impressive, and most of us looked forward to hearing from him of developments over the next few months. The highlight of my next night of duty at the operations center was to have talented Vietnamese soldiers in the combined center preparing charts and overlays for presentations by advisors on the pacification plan the next day. The four Ps were listed in my notes on 5 January. A planned operation in Trieu Phong District would not get under way on time due to adverse weather and road conditions, factors known to exist during the preparation. Hence the four Ps: piss poor prior planning, Sector Staff...