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137 9 Sector Staff Work The Oil and the Glue September–December 1968 The previous chapter outlined events associated with my transition to the sector operations advisor position. This chapter describes my day-to-day routine experiences as the Team 19 planning and operations officer up to the end of 1968. Significant projects are narrated in later chapters. Planning had been under way for a few days for a Territorial Forces sector operation on 16 September. A helicopter assault was to be launched from an airfield to the northwest of the Ga Bridge using Mai Linh forces. The pickup point was between Highway 1 and the Thach Han River to the immediate north of the bridge. There were to be five Huey’s and two gunships initially. Then two Chinooks with three sorties each were to follow. The operation was a follow-up to the Mai Linh contacts with the VC in August around the abandoned village of Nhan Bieu Two. The assault landing zone was to the southwest. The airlift was delayed for two reasons. First, the target landing zone had been moved farther south, with the aim of blocking any VC from withdrawing into the hinterland. Second, we were advised that an information leak at sector level the day before may have compromised the plan. This change led to adjustments in the artillery fire plan. The Team 19 assistant sector advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Karl Schelhammer, U.S. Army, accompanied 911 RF Company. He and the aviators were frustrated by the delays incurred. The operation continued and sweeps by the troops were uneventful. No contact was made with the enemy. A joint command post had been set up at Nhan Bieu One near a 138 TEAM 19 IN VIETNAM primary school. The children in their breaks gathered around us, being inquisitive. Some interesting side observations were made at the airfield. The command post included a Vietnamese junior officer, Second Lieutenant Phuc, who had the title of communications officer . Phuc was a nephew of the province chief. He acted as though the world owed him a living, and in the vernacular would probably be classed as a brat. My counterpart, Captain Cuu, had to direct Phuc to erect a 292 aerial for our communications. With a “Who, me?” expression on his face Phuc reluctantly got on with the job. Fortunately, we did not have to work with him again. In a personal review of the operation I thought the allocation of U.S. Army helicopters was of training value only to the Territorial Forces, and of little benefit to the operation. The troops came out of the area by foot. They could have approached on foot quietly to gain surprise, rather than by aircraft with the unavoidable noise. The advisory team at the Gio Linh District sub-sector headquarters was located less than three kilometers from the southern boundary of the demilitarized zone, well within the range of a quick NVA assault. Quang Tri City was twenty kilometers to the south via Highway 1. Lieutenant Colonel Mooney had an aspiration for the Gio Linh sub-sector to be relocated to a relatively safer place. He asked me to speak to the senior district advisor there, Major Chuck Slaby, and to write an appreciation on the problem. Mooney confided to me “each time I see Chuck off to Gio Linh I feel it will be the last time that I will see him.” Such was his concern. A liaison officer from 1/8 Cavalry, ACD, came to the sector headquarters to discuss details of an operation scheduled for the following day at the village of Thuong Xa, six kilometers to the southeast. Two companies were to operate there for the night by forming a cordon around the village. By mid-morning, 18 September , there had been no enemy contact at Thuong Xa. The U.S. troops had been in the cordon all night. Local forces conducted the village search in the daylight hours. Some of the detainees held were under the control of the Vietnamese military and police forces. The cavalry officer in charge requested that the detainees be handed over to them at the conclusion of the search. This request was declined by the local Vietnamese officer in command. The U.S. troops did not argue, probably happy to take back the statistics to headquarters rather than face the administrative problems of managing the detainees . Any intelligence arising would be passed back to the ACD. I [3.21.104.109...

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