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123 8 Transition from District to Province September 1968 During our handover discussions in May, Major Michael Casey (AATTV) indicated that the Mai Linh advisory position for an Australian Army major was not very challenging. His debriefing with the commanding officer AATTV in Saigon included the recommendation that the sector operations officer position would be a more appropriate position. On 20 June 1968 my Australian commanding officer informed me that I was to stay in Mai Linh. This was not of concern to me at the time, as I was still becoming familiar with the general operating environment. Working with the U.S. Army in a foreign country in a war situation was enough to handle in any position. In hindsight, the first four months was a period of further development for me. I wrote home about the confidence that was growing in me as a military professional. There were frequent dealings with senior officers. The subjects covered in these discussions were associated with counterinsurgency and pacification. It seemed that the point of view of the local Australian was worth hearing. Occasionally differences of opinion existed, but they helped to develop sound professional and personal relationships. I was able to argue my point of view succinctly, without putting in doubt my loyalty and respect to whomever I was addressing, whether a junior, a peer, or a senior. To Eva I wrote: “I feel it is a culmination of my home life, my schooling and military education, your influence, and my Australian nature that makes me who I am.” On 8 July I wrote: “My job goes on from day to day, and my thought each day is that what I am doing is part of our contribution to the people of Vietnam.” A later letter from Eva elicited this mid-July response: “No one 124 TEAM 19 IN VIETNAM will be allowed to take me for granted, have no fear of that. I will work for the Vietnamese as long as they are in need, but they will not be using me, I can assure you. So far I’ve had to assert myself on two occasions in that direction.” In early September 1968 the weather was dry and mild, and very pleasant for all to work in. In a reflective mood I noted that military operational work with the Territorial Forces was more like a “day time walk in the bush, once or twice a week.” We were constantly on the alert when deployed, and prepared for immediate action at any instant. Contacts with the enemy were frequent, but the district chief made sure we were not too close to the action. Such was the security situation at the time. Further, it was not the usual thing for the district chief to be out and about at nighttime. If I had chosen to be on night deployments with a PF platoon or an RF company, I would have become a security problem for the district chief and his staff. He was very protective of each of his advisors, so it was judged to be prudent to work within the boundaries he subtly indicated. This was rather humbling, as the Australian way of operating was to not give the enemy the advantage of the cover of the night. A clear majority of the Vietnamese people in Quang Tri City and adjacent hamlets and villages were supportive of the GVN. This area was in the coastal plains of the province. It was a relatively secure area, thanks to the allied main force formations that were further out, in the mountains to the west and near the DMZ. In Australian military doctrine the enemy involved in revolutionary warfare could be carrying out actions in the political and military spheres over several phases: Passive Phase, Active Phase, and Counter-Offensive Phase.1 The phases overlapped, as was the case in Quang Tri Province, with regression and progression from one phase to another happening concurrently. This situation continuously exercised the minds of commanders at all levels in Vietnam. Many of the post–Vietnam War writings highlight the ebb and flow experienced in the conflict in South Vietnam during this protracted war. On 8 September my local commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Harley Mooney, recommended me for the S3 (operations officer) advisory position in Team 19. The earlier period in the province was an ideal preparation for such a role, and I was ready for more challenging work in Quang Tri. The circumstances behind the recommendation...

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