Losing Vietnam: How America Abandoned Southeast Asia

Appendix B

Appendix B JGS Assessments on Friendly/ Enemy Activities of the Ceasefire REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM MINISTRY OF DEFENSE JOINT GENERAL STAFF/RVNAF J-3 TEL: 32.325 M E M O R A N D U M No 3823 /TTM/P343 APO 4002, 11 Oct 74 SUBJECT: Assessment on Friendly/Enemy Activities after the Ceasefire . 1. General: This memo is designed to present considerations regarding enemy/ friendly activities after the Ceasefire on 28 Jan 73 and particularly after 2 Dec 73, on which date started strong enemy strategic changes. The data and facts used in this assessment are provided by Corps + MRs’ reports through recordings and statistics of computers, and are compiled through the following 3 parts: a. Activity level b. Combat effectiveness c. Activity time during the day 336 Appendix B 2. Activity level: a. Enemy activity (Inclosure 1) (1) Although they had signed the Ceasefire Agreement the Communists have not abandoned their intention of taking over South Vietnam by arms so they have pursued their aggressive attacks against RVNAF units. Since early Dec 73, they have launched again large scale attacks at regiment level, typically through violations at Quang-Duc Front (MR2) the level of enemy attacks in 1974 seems to decrease, (in average 55 incidents per week) but on the contrary, a striking fact reveals that since March 74 the Communists have launched repeatedly large scale campaigns at division level with tremendous intensity not inferior to that of their offensive in 1972. The difference between the war situation in 1974 and 1972 is about rate. In 1974, big battles have occurred in separate locations and times while in 1972 the battles happened simultaneously and were equally distributed according to time and space. (2) Enemy attacks by fire are also noticeable as to intensity and degree. ABF level was recorded as 69 incidents in average per regular force units, increased to 124 incidents/ week during the 2nd quarter CY.74 and kept rising to 169 incidents/week during the 2 months of July and August 1974. Another noteworthy fact is that since Aug 74 the enemy has employed 130mm guns in the Quang Nam area (while in 1972 these guns were only used in Tri Thien area) and 100mm, 105mm guns and howitzers in Binh Dinh area, etc. . . . b. Friendly activity (Incl 2) Since early Dec 73 the RVNAF has not been able to remain passive in face of more and more serious violations so it has Appendix B 337 had to react with energetic retaliations. RVNAF initiated fire contacts from 4 incidents/week in the 1st quarter CY.74 rose to 60 incidents/week during the period up June 74 and kept ascending to 109 incidents/week in the months of July and August 74. This fact shows that the RVNAF in general, and the regular force, in particular, have been determined to safeguard the integrity of the territory and to pulverize the Communists land and population grab attempt. 3. Combat effectiveness: The data furnished by Corps & MRs during the period since Dec 73 on which date strong activities of both sides started until 7 Sep 74, are recorded and analyzed to evaluate the combat effectiveness of regular force units and enemy forces. a. RVNAF Regular Force combat effectiveness: (Incl 3) (1) Fire contact rate: Among the total figure of 5,087 clashes between the regular force and the enemy, 2,518 incidents were initiated by the regular force, or 49%. Analysis by separate MRs: - MR1 : 47% - MR2 : 39% - MR3 : 59% - MR4 : 59% The above results indicate fire contacts during security operations initiated by the regular force in MRs 3 and 4 claim the highest rates (59%). (2) Fire contact results: 338 Appendix B Through 5,087 clashes, the RVNAF regular force killed 23,410 enemy troops. In average in every clash 4.6 enemy troops were killed. Analysis of enemy killed in each clash in different MRs: RVNAF Eny initiated MR initiated fire and reacted by Regular Force contacts regular force Rate - MR1 3.9 2.9 3.4 - MR2 4.8 5.3 5.1 - MR3 4.7 1.8 3.5 - MR4 9.8 0.8 6.2 Nationwide 5.8 3.4 4.6 In general the results of friendly initiated fire contacts are more successful. In MR3, as compared with fire contact rate, friendly forces score a very high rate, but the results are equal to MR1 and fewer than MR2. In...