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1 Introduction Traditionally, German military history research has concentrated on two groups of topics in analyzing the ground warfare operations in the west in 1944. The Allied invasion in June and the defensive fighting in Normandy,1 followed by the preparations for and execution of the Ardennes Offensive in the autumn and winter of 1944,2 were the primary subjects of scholarly investigation. Nonetheless, there so far has been no corresponding study of the breathtaking interim campaign of maneuver and the rapid sequence of combat actions that shifted into a situation of positional warfare conducted along fixed lines. Within this period, encompassing the months of August and September 1944, the focal points of military events shifted over distances of up to one thousand kilometers in a matter of just a few days: from Normandy and from the French Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts into the region of the Netherlands, Germany’s western borders, and the Vosges Mountains of Alsace. The retreat of the German military forces from the sectors of Western Europe that had been occupied since 1940 constitutes an important facet of the final phase of World War II that is quite worth studying in terms of its course and consequences.3 The military events in France meant that Germany lost the advantageous strategic position it had held when its continental back door was still secure—something that Hitler considered essential in any successful move to the east. The nature of the German retreat, especially the rapid progress of operations following the Allied breakout from the Normandy beachhead in early August, caused the Allied military commanders to nurture the hope of finishing the war in Europe in 1944. That estimate of the situation was also shared by many of the German senior commanders.4 The fall of Paris on August 25 was perceived by world opinion as a symbolic indicator that the end of the Third Reich was near. Instead, following the disastrous defeats and the heavy losses during the fighting withdrawal, the German army within a matter of days was able to reestablish a contiguous front line and achieve a relative consolidation of its situation in the west. 2 Rückzug The object of this study is a detailed investigation of this phenomenon , which even at the time caused surprise and produced assumptions that remain controversial to this day. The sudden change in the situation produced an operational pause, and not only in the immediate combat actions. The stabilization of the front line, which happened even without the German commanders in the west realizing it initially, made it possible for Hitler to consolidate his plans for the Ardennes Offensive. That last German large-scale offensive of World War II, whose indirect effects were fatal for the German Army in the East and the population of eastern Germany, also made the British and American political negotiating positions at Yalta more difficult. Modern German military historiography increasingly has made an effort to achieve a broad perspective and take a pluralistic approach to the in-depth study of World War II. This has resulted in a shift of emphasis toward an approach that is oriented in socialhistory terms.5 The author of this study, however, feels the obligation to pursue a more traditional approach in his analysis. In so doing, he cites the words of Wolfgang von Groote, who stressed that the military historian continues to have the fundamental task of closing “gaps in our knowledge as to the course of military events . . . by carefully, critically , and expertly analyzing the sources.”6 Proceeding accordingly, the objective of this study is to describe and analyze the planning and the combat actions of the time within their geographic context, and above all from the German perspective—from the level of the German Supreme Commander West (Oberbefehlshabers West—OB West). A complete and balanced study, however, is impossible solely on the basis of the German military records. To prevent the study from becoming too one-sided and thus producing distorted judgments , we will consider the operational objectives of the Allies, and especially their attendant problems of coalition warfare. As a consequence , however, we must forego the investigation of some of the interesting questions that arise in the context of the wartime events in general. The reciprocal interdependencies of the Western Front and the Eastern Front, the situation within the Reich, and the operations conducted by the German navy and the Luftwaffe are not covered, or they are merely touched on in this study. General interest...

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