Rückzug: The German Retreat from France, 1944

11. The Situation Estimate Prepared by the Operations Staffs and the Failure of the Concept of a German "Counteroffensive from the Move"

233 Chapter 11 The Situation Estimate Prepared by the Operations Staffs and the Failure of the Concept of a German “Counteroffensive from the Move” 1. Situation Estimates and Decisions toward the End of the First Ten-Day Period in September (a) The Allies and the “Terminal Phase” of the Fight against the German Reich In his September 9 situation report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower emphasized among other things that although German resistance had been believed close to collapse in recent weeks, it had “become somewhat stiffer” following the shift of combat operations to the vicinity of the Reich border. Moreover, he now saw the danger that the continuation of Allied operations might be considerably restricted because of the blockage of the Scheldt River estuary, which was still in German hands.1 That meant that the situation was now being assessed in a new light at Allied headquarters. There were many indications that Eisenhower now wanted to give the Broad Front strategy the logistical foundation that it had been lacking until then. In contrast to what American official historian Forrest Pogue has written, no new phase in Allied operations planning began following that reference to the significance of Antwerp.2 For the time being, in fact, there was nothing more than a verbal reference to the importance of the Scheldt estuary. The emphasis in Eisenhower’s September 13 directive, issued shortly thereafter, was instead on a new element, the airborne and ground joint operation designated MARKET-GARDEN, as proposed by Montgomery. The plan called for Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton’s First Allied Airborne Army to commit the U.S. 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, the British 1st Airborne Division, and the Polish 1st Separate Airborne 234 Part 3 Brigade in order to seize the bridges across the Meuse, Waal, and Nederrijn rivers and some of the canals in the Grave–Nijmegen– Arnhem area.3 The airborne assault phase was designated Operation MARKET. The British Second Army was given the objective of attacking across the Meuse–Scheldt Canal and then pushing across the bridges seized by the paratroopers, all the way to IJsselmeer. That phase was designated Operation GARDEN. The advantages expected to accrue from this coordinated operation were quite obvious . The Allied forces would be able to cut off all German forces in western Holland while at the same time outflanking the West Wall and reaching a favorable position for the thrust into the North German Plain.4 The fact that the British population would be freed from the threat of the V-2 missiles that the Germans had been firing from that area since September 8 also played a role in the decision to launch Operation MARKET-GARDEN.5 Eisenhower was fully aware that this operation, scheduled to be launched on September 17, could lead to a delay in the opening of the Scheldt River.6 Another factor in this decision was the temporary improvement in the supply situation. Eisenhower’s assessment of September 9, therefore, now assumed a secondary significance in the orderissuing procedure. Neither the U.S. First nor the U.S. Third Armies suffered from any acute supply shortages at the start of the second ten-day period in September. On September 12, Hodges and Patton told Bradley that the fuel supplies of their armies would suffice for a push all the way to the Rhine, and they even had artillery ammunition for as much as four to five days of combat.7 The frontline commanders undoubtedly were not getting all of the supply tonnage they had requested, although they often inflated their figures. But the overall situation remained. And as Eisenhower now began to realize, without Antwerp, the cause of the logistical problems could not be eliminated entirely. Because of the unplanned swift advance and the ever-longer transportation distances, it would have been impossible to establish a regular supply and depot system.8 But the tremendous series of improvisations that the Allied command was able to patch together would have made it possible for the central group of armies—i.e., the 12th Army Group—to conduct a largescale offensive with one of its two American field armies.9 The prerequisite for that, however, was that the other army would have to assume a defensive posture during that period. At that time the supply situation of the northern group of The Situation Estimate Prepared by the Operations Staffs 235...