Rückzug: The German Retreat from France, 1944

4. The Initial Situation in Southern France

47 Chapter 4 The Initial Situation in Southern France 1. Plans and Assessments (a) The German Command and the Problem of a Landing in the South As early as June 1943 an intelligence assessment prepared by the Wehrmacht operations staff had identified the organization of a French expeditionary corps as an indicator of an enemy offensive directed at southern France.1 Concrete fears about an Allied landing along the French Riviera, however, did not solidify among the German leadership until August 1943, when units of OB West relieved the Italian Fourth Army in the sector to the east of the mouth of the Rhône River.2 The Germans took over coastal defenses with little difficulty, but following the forced evacuation of Sardinia and Corsica serious concerns soon arose based on the still rather vague indicators of an enemy landing. OB West touched on that problem in his October 1943 situation estimate. As Rundstedt noted: “I believe that the attack options open to the Anglo-Americans exist primarily along the Channel , probably in conjunction with an attack . . . against the French Mediterranean coast.”3 But Rundstedt also pointed to the hitherto largely ignored Bay of Biscay sector held by the First Army as the possible target of a large-scale landing, combined with attacks in the area of the mouth of the Rhône River. The scope of such a threat was far out of proportion to the available defensive resources. Rundstedt concluded that all the Germans could do along the Atlantic was to increase observation efforts. Thus, there was a blatant shortfall between the resources available and the potentially worthwhile invasion targets on either coast. Rundstedt considered a landing along the Mediterranean very possible because of the significance of Toulon and Marseille. The Rhône Valley, which was a natural gateway 48 Part 1 to the north, would then be a “decisive and important direction of the enemy thrust.”4 According to the OB West situation estimate, however, the southern coast would only be the scene of a secondary operation to support the main offensive in northern France. With Führer Directive 51, the southern sector assumed a greater significance , essentially accepting Rundstedt’s ideas and reinforcing the Western Front. In early 1944, Jodl and Hitler anticipated Allied landing operations along the periphery of Fortress Europe that would dissipate German forces and support the Allied main effort, which would fall along the Channel. Since the turn of the year there had been an increasing flow of intelligence about the buildup of a strong Allied reserve in North Africa. All the indicators seemed to confirm that this reserve would not be fed in to support the landings at AnzioNettuno , but rather would be committed to develop Corsica into an Allied “unsinkable aircraft carrier.” The potential participation of French troops forced the German leadership to conclude that the coasts of southern France and of Liguria were particularly vulnerable . On February 17, 1944, Jodl offered the assessment that “the next major enemy operation was planned in the western Mediterranean , specifically against the French Mediterranean coast.”5 Hitler thereupon approved the reinforcement of that sector. Because it supposedly was impossible to organize a full army group (Heeresgruppe ) with its corresponding wartime strength, as Rundstedt had wanted,6 only an army task group (Armeegruppe) was activated.7 On June 6, Army Task Group G consisted of two field armies of seven corps and sixteen divisions, including eight based in the threatened Mediterranean sector. Blaskowitz, the commanding general , thought at that point that it should be possible to commit the Nineteenth Army along the Riviera “for the purpose of beating off landings, or if they are successful, to drive the enemy back into the water with a counterattack.”8 But the heavy losses from the fighting along the invasion front in the north did not leave the forces of Army Task Group G unscathed. Although a major enemy operation in the Mediterranean area was considered certain,9 and landing exercises had already been observed , several major units were withdrawn from Army Task Group G, despite the potential threat of a second invasion.10 That fact alone shows the seriousness of the German personnel shortages in France. Thus, with Army Task Group G so weakened, it proved impossible The Initial Situation in Southern France 49 to do the very thing that Field Marshals Rundstedt and Rommel had advocated as early as June—the evacuation of...