The Gulf: The Bush Presidencies and the Middle East

2. Beliefs and Style

27 2 Beliefs and Style While foreign policy is invariably the result of numerous factors, the president occupies a central place in the foreign policy process. As Rahm Emanuel, former chief of staff to President Barack Obama, has explained, “Every president is different and presidents define their presidency.”1 The personality of a president is unique and has a significant impact on decision making in the White House. The international challenges faced by the United States from 1989 to 1993 and from 2001 to 2009 made the president’s personality of particular importance. Both eras were marked by a high degree of crisis, insulating White House decision making and placing the president at the center of the action. For George H. W., crises came in the form of the end of the cold war coupled with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, while for George W., the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, served to put the White House on a constant state of alert. Despite other factors that impede the impact of personality on decision making—such as bureaucratic politics—during each of these periods , the president’s personality appears to have had a substantial impact. One important factor in elevating the significance of each president’s personality was that the United States faced fundamental changes in the international political system during both administrations. For George H. W., the end of the cold war left the United States without a clear purpose , unsure of what the future might hold. For George W., the United States faced a situation similar to the formative period of the cold war. Such transitions require direct presidential involvement, allowing for a greater impact by the president and other personalities in the White House. Thus, this chapter will examine the beliefs and styles of George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush. In doing so, the characteristics of en- 28 THE GULF lightened realism and cowboy liberalism will be enunciated further, as we compare the two men to gain a better understanding of them. I will discuss the four main characteristics of George H. W.’s enlightened realist approach: pragmatism and experience; flexibility and compromise; negotiation; and multilateral internationalism. Together, these attributes helped to produce the caution and risk aversion characteristic of the man. On the other hand, George W.’s cowboy liberal approach is characterized by an emphasis on ideology and gut instinct; certainty and competition; messianic universalism; and unilateral nationalism. These characteristics combined to emphasize a risk-acceptant approach to American foreign policy. Subsequent chapters will demonstrate how these beliefs impacted the decisions the two Bushes made in the Middle East. Pragmatism and Experience vs. Ideology and Gut Instinct Few presidents have been as prepared and experienced as George H. W. Bush when they were elected into office. George H. W.’s experiences proved significant to his decision making, as he relied considerably on his own ideas and was essentially his own chief foreign policy advisor. In addition , he had knowledge about, interest in, and understanding of foreign policy and the foreign policy process. In contrast, George W. had a lack of knowledge about and interest in the field of foreign policy. In responding to questions about his competence in foreign policy, George W. openly “admitted that he had much to learn about world affairs.”2 The contrast could not have been starker. George H. W. shunned the politics of ideology, preferring to rely on his experience and knowledge when making decisions. Rather than digging in and holding fast to ideological principles, George H. W. preferred cautious examination and finding pragmatic solutions to problems. When he served as the director of the CIA, for example, the agency faced a credibility crisis. A number of critical external investigations, most significant President Ford’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), claimed major flaws in the CIA’s annual reports on Soviet strategic capabilities. The PFIAB report suggested that the CIA was vastly underestimating Soviet capabilities and called upon President Ford to allow an external Beliefs and Style 29 review of the CIA’s estimates. George H. W. put his own politics aside, sought a “safe” route, and supported the idea of an external review. Team B, the external review team, took a hawkish view of Soviet capabilities— one far to the right of his personal position—while the internal estimates of Team A suggested a more moderate Soviet adversary. Despite his personal disagreements with the...