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217 13 The Dutch Contribution to the Defense of the Central Sector Jan Hoffenaar From 1951 until the end of the 1960s and following a period of reticence, the Netherlands was fully committed to making a meaningful military contribution to the NATO defense of the Central Sector in Europe.1 Since 1945, it had been quite obvious to most of those involved that the defense of the Netherlands could be guaranteed only within the context of an alliance and that such a defense had to be established as far forward as possible.2 The initial hesitation resulted from two political prerequisites. First, in the second half of the 1940s the Dutch armed forces were focused almost entirely on deployment to the Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia). This was the top priority at that time. Over 150,000 young men—out of a population of approximately 10 million—were hurriedly prepared for duty and deployed overseas. There they mainly experienced guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare . That was very different from participating in regular operations in a much larger context, which was what would be required from them in Western Europe. The Dutch armed forces were chiefly oriented toward satisfying short-term needs. The development of armed forces that were better suited to operations in Europe as expected in the long term was therefore neglected.3 The second factor preventing the Netherlands from devoting all its efforts to the rapid development of an extensive allied defensive force in Europe was the fact that particularly the Social Democrats, who for a number of years led successive governments together with the Catholics, did not perceive the Soviet Union as an acute military threat. They wished to mark time following the Dutch military withdrawal from Indonesia in 1950. Greater impor- 218 Jan Hoffenaar tance was given to economic reconstruction: more money to stimulate the economy and less for defense. In their view, that was the best way to keep the influence of Communism within manageable proportions. They considered the armed forces mainly as an insurance premium that was due in order to guarantee American involvement in the security of Europe.4 I do not intend to suggest that in the late 1940s Dutch politicians and soldiers were not concerned about the defense of their country. There were, however, other issues that were given higher priority. After all, a guilder could be spent only once. The Initial Plans Before 1 July 1949 the Netherlands had in the event of a land attack only emergency plans to evacuate the members of the Dutch Royal Family, together with approximately ten thousand other prominent citizens, to Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles.5 The most important task of the operational troops not deployed to the Dutch East Indies was to cover that evacuation. Virtually all attention was focused on the military deployment in the Dutch East Indies. In addition, the British officers from the British Military Mission to the Netherlands Government who assisted in the reestablishment of the Dutch army (initially with a view to a Dutch contribution to the occupation of Germany) were particularly unimpressed by the quality of their Dutch comrades. They had been on the sidelines for too long, either as prisoners of war or in Great Britain, and so had little or no experience of modern warfare.6 From 1 July 1949 onward, automatic evacuation was no longer part of the emergency defense provisions. Three months earlier, the short-term plan of the Western Union Defense Organization had entered into force. This plan provided the framework for the Dutch plan LION, according to which the Dutch troops would maintain a static defensive line on the IJssel River, so as to protect the economic and political heart of the country situated in its western parts.7 However, while most of the troops were being sent to the Dutch East Indies, this plan would exist primarily only on paper. There was some coordination with plan ABIGAIL of the British occupying force in Germany, the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR).8 In an emergency, the commander of BAOR would make available two divisional regiments of his armored corps.9 The alert procedure for the Dutch troops was linked to that of the British occupation zone.10 Initially the British also played a leading role in the development of the air defense system.11 Until the late 1950s the Netherlands would have major shortcomings in that area, as in fact did the allied air defense in general.12 [3...

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