Blueprints for Battle: Planning for War in Central Europe, 1948-1968

7. The Logistics System of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact Armed Forces in the 1950s and 1960s

109 7 The Logistics System of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact Armed Forces in the 1950s and 1960s Dimitri N. Filippovych During the 1950s and 1960s the strength and organizational structure of the strategic operational logistics system and the unit trains of the Soviet armed forces and the Warsaw Pact members underwent essential changes. Starting during the second half of the 1940s and the first half of the 1950s, the changes to the logistics system resulted from both the reduction and accompanying reorganization of the Soviet armed forces, and the formation of the Soviet Groups of Forces outside the territory of the Soviet Union.1 The major objective of modernizing the logistics structure was to increase the ability of its components to support the missions of independently operating units and major formations. Among the most important initial changes was the replacement of pack and cart transport by automotive transport at all levels of logistical support. The exception was for the mountain infantry corps and divisions, where the older means of transport continued to be used for carrying weapon systems and equipment. By 1950 this process was complete. The result was a major surge in the carrying capacity of the transportation units. This process was accompanied by increases in the logistical and mobility capabilities that improved the supply of the ground forces and naval units, and expedited medical and other evacuations, and an increased mobility of the major logistics units and facilities, particularly the combat service support elements.2 Obviously the logistical structures and capabilities increasingly were 110 Dimitri N. Filippovych determined by the organizational structure of the forces supported, the requirements of the operational art, the character and scope of operations, the increased maneuverability of major combined-arms units, and the capability to switch from one operation to another without significant interruption. This process implied a significant growth in the material and other logistical support tasks in favor of large-scale unit operations on the one hand, and an increase in the influence of logistics on the success of an operation on the other.3 Nevertheless, the concentration of forces and logistics resources in the decisive operational directions continued to remain one of the basic principles of the operational art. Most exercises, including those conducted in the early 1950s by the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, were characterized by a noticeable rise in the combat and personnel strength of the major units and an increased complexity of the required logistics tasks. The major problem to be resolved was how to achieve larger logistical autonomy of the groupings of forces and increased mobility of the logistics support assets.4 First of all, the forces required more and more equipment, thus straining the supply and maintenance capabilities of the logistics system. Hence, by late 1953 the daily ammunition requirement for a division was 2.5 times what it had been in 1946; for petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) the increase was almost 10 times. In 1953 one volley of fire from a rifle corps— minus tanks, self-propelled guns, and antiaircraft artillery—amounted to more than thirty-seven metric tons, which was seven times the amount fired by a single Soviet corps at the end of the Great Patriotic War (World War II). The quantity of daily supplies required by the subordinate units had also almost doubled, as verified during exercises. The scope of the military supplies consumed by the ground forces and naval units was also widening.5 The increasing amounts of material supply and force deployment and relocation tasks, together with the steady tendency toward highly dynamic and deep operations, rapidly intensified the movement of transportation and other assets along the forward main supply and evacuation routes and the other major military roads. The result was much higher requirements on the installation , technical management, security, and repair and maintenance of the major military roads. Simultaneously, the demands grew for transport services via the rail, water, and aerial lines of communications (LOC). The development of operational-level logistics at the army or front (army group) level developed along two major lines: (1) the establishment and operation of the inherited system of logistical support, as was common during times of war and peace; and (2) the development of optimum structures for logistics The Logistics System of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact Armed Forces 111 units and facilities and efficient procedures for operating logistics assets in future wartime operations.6...