Blueprints for Battle: Planning for War in Central Europe, 1948-1968

6. Waste and Confusion? NATO Logistics from the Dutch Perspective

93 6 Waste and Confusion? NATO Logistics from the Dutch Perspective Herman Roozenbeek Within NATO, logistics was and still is a national responsibility, which reflects practical, political, and economic considerations. Every country that provided troops to an operation was expected to provide the necessary logistic support as well. That included both the preparation in peacetime and the actual support of operations in wartime. Every country had to provide for proper equipment, adequate materiel, and the build-up of sufficient stock levels necessary to maintain the combat readiness of its forces. Effective and robust logistics organizations and procedures had to be established, and the logistics units in particular were to be skilled and trained to perform their assigned tasks, even under great pressure. In addition to the principle of national responsibility, allied logistics had a second characteristic. The architects of the alliance were well aware that circumstances might arise in which a country—even if only locally and temporarily —could not meet its logistics obligations, which in turn would place the operational task itself at risk. Vital harbor installations or munitions depots, for instance, could be destroyed by conventional aerial bombardment or attack by nuclear weapons. A combat division might have to deploy for operational reasons far from its national supply lines. In such cases, the member states committed themselves to mutual support, through the provision of materiel or supplies, or by providing services, such as transportation. Situations requiring mutual support arose primarily in crisis conditions. At such moments, simple procedures, short lines, and clear command struc- 94 Herman Roozenbeek tures were a matter of life and death. International consultations at high political or military levels were in no way an appropriate response. An additional complication was that mutual support was more difficult because every country had different equipment and its own logistics procedures. As early as 1950, NATO was aware that the principle of national responsibility hampered a common solution to logistical problems. Identifying the logistics problem was easier than solving it, however. A Dutch memorandum in 1957 noted: “There is waste and confusion in NATO’s present logistics supply system. The principal causes of this waste and confusion are lack of coordination and inadequate cooperation resulting from the fact that logistics are a purely national responsibility. The Netherlands government is convinced that, through effective logistical collaboration and with the resources available, the efficiency of our defense can be greatly increased.” The Netherlands looked for a solution that leveraged “integrated lines of supply ,” “coordinated storage of ammunition and other supplies,” “joint use of maintenance facilities for heavy equipment and electronics,” and “a coordinated procurement system for spare parts.” But what did all this mean precisely ? As it turned out, the author of the memorandum had no clear idea how to achieve the goal, and he definitely could not foresee its implications. Most important, was the government of the Netherlands itself prepared to make the financial sacrifices that undoubtedly would be required to implement all of those measures? This question was never really put to the test. The Netherlands ultimately softened its memorandum by weakening the original concrete proposals, which were given a much less radical interpretation. “Integrated lines of supply” and “coordinated storage of ammunition and other supplies,” for example, were said to mean nothing more than establishing storage sites on the territory of another member state.1 Far-reaching logistics integration and standardization implied that countries would have to surrender some of their autonomy, even in peacetime, which could provoke farreaching economic and financial consequences. In fact, most of the NATO countries were not prepared to go that far. Establishing an integrated logistics system also would have taken a long time, and NATO felt already that its preparations were running behind those of the Soviet Union. The supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR), therefore, concluded in 1954: “The attainment of a completely integrated logistics support system within NATO, although militarily desirable, is from a practical point of view considered to be too remote in point of time to provide an acceptable solution to the immediate problem of overcoming present deficiencies.”2 No progress was made beyond striking a compromise between Waste and Confusion? 95 what was desirable from the perspective of military operations and what was feasible in political and economic terms. It should come as no surprise that discussion concerning logistics integration primarily took place in the Central Sector, since that area of operations would be defended...