The Philosophy of David Cronenberg

Self-Creation, Identity, and Authenticity: A Study of A History of Violence and Eastern Promises

125 David Cronenberg’s early work in science fiction and horror may seem to bear only a faint similarity to A History of Violence (2005) and Eastern Promises (2007). These later films broaden Cronenberg’s repertoire into the genres of action and gangster movies. However, there are important thematic continuities between these films and his earlier films. Cronenberg’s work continuously explores questions about the nature of the self and the relation of the self to the human body: Shivers (1975), The Brood (1979), Scanners (1981), Videodrome (1983), and The Fly (1986) all raise challenging philosophical questions about personal identity. It is helpful to distinguish two main groups of problems that are usually classified as philosophical questions of personal identity: metaphysical problems of personal identity, and practical problems of personal identity. The metaphysical problems of personal identity are a main point of concern in Cronenberg’s earlier work in horror and science fiction. By directly addressing the practical problems of personal identity, A History of Violence and Eastern Promises expand the range of philosophical reflections on the self that are explored in Cronenberg ’s films. Metaphysical Problems The central metaphysical problems of personal identity are concerned with determining both the criteria for being a person and the criteria for persons to persist over time. The genre of science fiction is an excellent medium for exploring these metaphysical puzzles. In The Fly, Seth Brundle (Jeff Goldblum ) is an ordinary scientist who is conducting research on teleportation. Brundle uses himself as a guinea pig to test whether his transporter pods can successfully transport a human. When he steps into the transporter Self-Creation, Identity, and Authenticity A Study of A History of Violence and Eastern Promises Daniel Moseley 126 Daniel Moseley pod he does not realize that a fly is in the pod with him. Their bodies are disintegrated, and Brundle appears to emerge from another pod. However, the post-transportation Brundle soon learns that the pretransportation Brundle and the fly have been genetically fused. The hybrid body sheds its human appearance and eventually transforms into a human-size fly. Since thehybridcreature that resultsfrom thetransportation processisnothuman, the philosophical question is: Did Seth survive the transportation process? Suppose that two people step into a transporter pod and the transportation process fused them into one living creature that appeared to be a normal human being. Would the resulting person be strictly identical with either of theoriginalpersonswhosebodieswerefused?Inadditiontostoriesinvolving the fusion of persons, or the fusion of insects and persons, there are science fiction cases involving the fission of persons. Suppose that Seth steps in one transporter pod, the original body is destroyed, and two people are created by the process. Would the pretransportation Seth survive the process? The resulting persons would think that they were Seth, and they would have all of Seth’s memories and dispositions. Would they be duplicates of Seth, or would Seth now have two bodies? These philosophical questions that emerge from cases involving the fission and fusion of persons are some of the central metaphysical problems of personal identity. Practical Problems Practical problems of personal identity, in contrast with the metaphysical problems, are not primarily concerned with what it is to be a person. The practical problems of personal identity focus on the question of who a person is. They often emerge from the first-person perspective and commonly arise when one seriously asks, “Who am I? Am I really who I think I am?” Seriously reflecting on these questions is often not an exercise in philosophy, and this kind of reflection may also serve as an ordinary attempt to understand one’s own character and commitments. The results of this kind of reflection are often central decisions and choices that are involved in the processes of self-discovery and self-creation. The form of self-discovery involved in having a practical identity is a matter of discovering, from the first-person perspective, who one really is. This form of self-discovery neither requires one to formulate a comprehensive metaphysical theory about personhood and persistence nor requires one to discover the best causal/scientific explanation of one’s behavior. Metaphysical theorizing and scientific explanations of the world are concerned with providing an accurate representation of the world from a third-person Self-Creation, Identity, and Authenticity 127 perspective (from the point of view that an all-knowing being would have on the world).1 This form of self...