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7. The Moscow Discussions
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141 chapter 7 the Moscow Discussions The Western powers had not adopted an airlift strategy in July, and they did not adopt one in August. Although the British and Americans expanded the airlift, doubt remained that it could sustain the city once bad weather set in. The Western powers relied on negotiation, not airlift, and hopes for a diplomatic breakthrough rose and fell. By the end of August, the two sides had agreed on the outline of an accord and directed the military governors to work out the details. Then it all collapsed. the u.s. air force reacted quickly to the decision to expand the airlift . On July 23, General Vandenberg directed MATS to send nine squadrons (81 aircraft and 243 crews) and a headquarters to Germany. If orders flowed quickly, implementation took longer. Vandenberg ordered two squadrons to go at once; the remainder would follow in pairs at seven-day intervals.1 Even this measured pace compounded the crowding at west German airfields. There were too few bases and not enough pilots, few spare parts and even fewer mechanics to install them. Available men and materials were not put to their best use: cargo loading was haphazard, flying discipline was erratic, and unloading in Berlin was plagued by long delays. Pilots flew twice the number of hours allowed, and desk officers dashed to the flight line for a jaunt to Berlin in whatever airplane happened to be available.2 Commanders saw such confusion as unavoidable; by the time it could be corrected , the airlift would be over. Major General William Tunner disagreed. Commander of the Hump airlift during the war and now MATS deputy commander for operations, Tunner had the expertise—and the persistence—to ensure a hearing. Still, it was a struggle, because Tunner’s ideas contradicted air force dogma. Since the days of Billy Mitchell, the air force had equated airpower with strategic bombing . Tunner thought transport mattered more than bombardment: the airplane’s ability to move people and equipment great distances overnight had revolutionized 142 Berlin on the Brink warfare. Unable to remain on the sidelines, he made a nuisance of himself until he secured appointment as commander of the new airlift headquarters in Germany. He arrived in Wiesbaden on July 29.3 Tunner reported to LeMay, who wasted no time on pleasantries or even discussion . “I expect you to produce,” he told Tunner. “I intend to,” Tunner shot back. He began organizing his headquarters in a rundown apartment house.4 One of the first tasks was to define the mission and determine how many planes were needed to achieve it. Sometime during Tunner’s first week, LeMay called Tunner’s chief of staff, Colonel Theodore R. (“Ross”) Milton, into his office, handed him a slide rule and a pad, and ordered him to produce the answer. It was all quite casual; Turkish officers dropped by for a chat with LeMay while Milton worked in a corner, the fate of 2 million people resting on his slide rule. Tossing in “some weather factors and various other guesses,” he came up with a number: 225 C-54s. Would Washington act on his estimate? That was hardly likely, because it would mean committing its entire air cargo fleet. Furthermore, LeMay had informed Washington that the most he could operate, given the weather and Tempelhof’s capacity, was 139 Skymasters.5 Tunner believed he had grasped the situation after a few days. He wrote to the MATS commander, Major General Laurence S. Kuter, that “the key to the whole problem is big airplanes and lots of them.” Echoing LeMay, he recommended replacing all C-47s with C-54s. Three days later, he reported, “The whole problem is pretty well reducible to certain essential denominators.” He singled out three: reducing turnaround time in Berlin, moving C-54s to the British zone, and creating a single Anglo-American airlift command.6 Steeped in Frederick Taylor’s theories of scientific management, Tunner regarded the derring-do of the stereotypical aviator as the source of the airlift’s problems. Reporters might gush about pilots working until they dropped or staff officers taking the afternoon off to fly coal to Berlin, but to Tunner, these were signs of ineptitude and inevitable failure.7 He seemed to believe that LeMay and Smith had chosen such techniques—dismissing them as “bomber generals” who did not understand airlift—when in truth, they had been driven by necessity. Facing unprecedented demands, they had done what they could...