Before the Quagmire: American Intervention in Laos, 1954-1961

Chapter 6: Dichotomy

Chapter 6 Dichotomy The cable that marked the beginning of the end of Horace Smith’s diplomatic career was Embassy Telegram (Embtel) 1300, a top-secret, “eyes only” message to Assistant Secretary of State J. Graham Parsons and James W. Riddleberger, director of ICA. Dated November 8, 1959, the telegram was a long assessment of US aid to Laos, cowritten with the new USOM director, John Tobler, who had arrived in Vientiane six weeks earlier . A former news correspondent in his early forties, Tobler had worked as a government information officer, graduated from the National War College, and served at ICA headquarters and on the Operations Coordinating Board. His instructions from Washington were to take a fresh look at the US aid program in Laos. Ambassador Smith found Tobler a keen observer of Lao affairs and an astute judge of the political significance of US actions. The two men engaged in “soul-searching” discussions, in Smith’s words, which helped crystallize their view of the “basic problems that beset our effort.”1 The first part of the telegram, written by Tobler and “fully supported” by Smith, estimated that “the chances are far better than even that this country will go down the drain” unless the US government made a much greater effort. If it was not prepared to make such an effort, the United States “should consider cutting our losses” in Laos and withdraw from the country as gracefully as possible. Acknowledging that such an action might appear “cowardly,” Tobler believed it preferable to “having Laos go down in history as a US defeat or, conversely, risk[ing] all-out war over [the] wrong place at [the] wrong time.”2 Tobler described a “state of siege” in Laos, with travel outside of the 132 Dichotomy 133 larger towns severely restricted and large areas of the country beyond government control. He believed that the US government was ill equipped to deal with Pathet Lao terror in the villages, yet America was closely identified with that effort. The US aid program was “built on quicksand,” Tobler declared, and the multiple, uncoordinated programs tended “to defeat each other.” Observing the contradictory courses of political action pursued by the embassy and the CIA station, he agreed with Ambassador Smith that agency support for the CDNI was “destroying the effectiveness of the Phoui regime, undermining U.S. prestige and opening the way to the most dangerous and potentially disastrous course of events.”3 The second part of the telegram was Smith’s political assessment, which called the CDNI the “greatest thorn in Phoui’s side.” Lacking political experience and unlikely to win at the polls, the CDNI had followed a “course of obstructionism” in the cabinet, with the expectation that its members would “come into full power one way or another.” Instead of supporting Phoui’s wish to extend the National Assembly’s mandate for a year, the CDNI apparently intended a “royal solution,” with the king naming an authoritarian, unconstitutional government. Such an outcome, Smith predicted, would cost Laos the international advantage of being the “only nation of the area with [a] democratic government.”4 The major problems facing Phoui, according to Smith, were the inaccessibility of remote areas in Laos, with no major road programs in sight; the likelihood that he would leave office after December 25 because of “unrealistic opposition” by the CDNI and “perhaps” the king; and the less-than-complete support from the US government, even though the prime minister had followed its advice. Smith reported, “[Phoui] has been especially confused and disheartened by what he considers a dichotomy in [the] US approach to Laos. He is convinced [that] blind [CIA] support and guidance to [the] CDNI has hobbled him to [the] point where to use his full powers would bring disaster to the country.”5 Smith elaborated on the “dichotomy” theme in a follow-up telegram to the State Department: Phoui, he cabled, “maintains that he personally knows beyond [a] doubt that [the] most influential members of CDNI [are] guided step-by-step by [the CIA] and that without continuous stepby -step planning[,] guidance[,] ghost writing[,] and financial and other support[, the] CDNI would never have been able to conceive and execute their blocking tactics or to organize and pay for political rallies and agents 134 Before the Quagmire in principal centers throughout [the] country.” The ambassador wrote that he had accepted the assurances of Allen Dulles...