Cosmopolitanism in the Age of Globalization: Citizens without States

Socratic Self-Examination

Mary P. Nichols Socratic Self-Examination Cosmopolitanism, Imperialism, or Citizenship? In contrast to traditional readings of classical political thought that focus on virtuous political communities and inegalitarian social orders, recent scholars have found in ancient thought philosophic resources for more open societies, liberal polities, democratic self-government, and even global perspectives. In a recent review essay, Patrick Deneen identifies a new democratic school of Platonic interpretation that holds that Plato “favored the open more dialogic possibilities of democracy” over any “closed systemization of either philosophy or politics.”1 Socrates, the ceaseless questioner or skeptic, takes a central place in this view. J. Peter Euben, for example, argues that Socrates appropriates for his “philosophical-political vocation” the democratic practices of Athens—such as “the tradition of democratic self-critique found in drama” and the Athenian practice of holding magistrates publicly accountable for their deeds while in office.2 Similarly, Dana Villa emphasizes Socrates’ service to his city as a gadfly, his “philosophical, dissident citizenship” that can serve as a model for liberal democracies.3 Whereas Villa emphasizes the alienating and critical stance of the “Socratic citizen” as he questions his own traditions and beliefs, 4 Martha Nussbaum points out that it is precisely our own traditions that separate us from our fellow humanity. By “awakening each and every person to self-scrutiny,” her democratic or egalitarian Socrates reveals what we have in common with others.5 In place of the “absolute negativity” that for Villa accompanies Socratic questioning, she finds in Socratic self-examination the basis of “world citizenship.”6 For Nussbaum “cultivating humanity” requires “an ability to see [our]selves not simply as citizens of some local region or group, but also, and above all, as human beings bound to all other human 14 Mary P. Nichols beings by ties of recognition and concern.”7 When Nussbaum writes, “You can either package your humanity in your politics or your politics in your humanity,” she suggests that one must make one or the other prior, and her advocacy of world citizenship makes clear what her priority is.8 Two years after Nussbaum published Cultivating Humanity, Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrensdorf contributed a monumental volume on the history of international relations theory, from the classical idealism of the Greek philosophers to various twentieth-century schools of thought. In their discussion of classical idealism, they also recognize the “cosmopolitan ” character of Socratic philosophizing, noting that “the philosophers’ hearts leap across familial, national, cultural, and temporal boundaries,” and quote Cicero’s statement that “Socrates judged himself to be a native and citizen of the world.”9 Pangle and Ahrensdorf, to be sure, cannot be included in the democratic school of Platonic interpretation, since they insist that from the original Socratic perspective, “a truly cosmopolitan spirit” was “likely to flourish only among a few noble souls dispersed through the various cities and nations.”10 They nevertheless conclude that Socratic philosophers could “reasonably hope that those few may have some appreciable influence upon their respective cities, mitigating patriotic xenophobia, imperialism, cruelty, and punitive moral fanaticism.” In other words, even though the emphasis is more on hope than on likelihood, those few might “cultivate humanity,”11 making their political communities more cosmopolitan and hence like themselves. My own reading accepts the critical character and openness of Socratic philosophy, but also its democratic thrust. If one understands the extent to which one does not know the truth about the whole, or one’s knowledge of ignorance, as Socrates describes his human wisdom (Apology 23b), one must remain open to others and what they may contribute to one’s pursuit of knowledge. Socrates is nevertheless better understood, I argue, contra Nussbaum as well as Pangle and Ahrensdorf, as a citizen-philosopher than as a world citizen.12 Nor is Socrates’ citizenship, in my view, merely that of a dissenting questioner. Plato’s Socrates, after all, maintained his loyalty to Athens throughout his life. Unlike the sophists, who wandered from city to city in the Greek world, Socrates rarely left the confines of Athens, unless serving in the Athenian army (Crito 52b; see also Phaedrus 230c–d). Several times in the Crito Socrates has the Laws refer to Athens as his “fatherland,” and he refers to the piety and respect he owes the Laws as he would a father (Crito 51a–c, 54c). Socratic Self-Examination 15 It is possible, of course, that Socrates’ loyalty to...