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ACTION ALONG THE NO NAME LINE The hard fighting and sacrifices of such frontline units as the Gloucestershire Battalion allowed UN forces to break contact with the enemy and withdraw in good order to prepared defensive positions , while at the same time inflicting heavy casualties and disrupting the Chinese timetable. To the west, U.S. I Corps began pulling back on 25 April. As the withdrawal continued in I Corps to Line Golden in front of Seoul, Lt. Gen. Van Fleet, Eighth U.S. Army commander, drew a new defensive line extending east and northeast from Line Golden to the coast, but he gave it no name. Running south of Ch’unch’on and Inje, this line became known as the No Name Line, or the general defense line that U.S. IX and X Corps and ROK III and I Corps were to occupy as they withdrew to conform with the pullback of the U.S. I Corps in the west. By 28 April I Corps had reached Line Golden, and soon the UN forces to the east took position along the No Name Line. As a result of the rapid but orderly withdrawal of UN forces, by 2 May the only contact with the enemy was in the far west in the ROK 1st Division sector of I Corps. Van Fleet ordered regimentalsized bases established in front of the main defensive positions, from which extensive patrolling was to be conducted to locate the enemy and provide early warning of a renewal of the Chinese offensive . Strong artillery forces were to support these advanced patrol bases. Meanwhile, along the general defense or No Name Line extensive field fortifications were being constructed. Chapter 8 U.S. IX Corps K a p ’ y o n g R i v e r P u k h a n R i v e r Soyang River Pukhan River P u k h a n R iv e r Hongch’on River Ch’ongp’yong Res H a n R i v e r 11 5Y 1 1B 2X 3 18 2 33 3 17 3A 3A 17 2 24 2 24 29 Sihch’on Sinwon-ni Haengju Kup’abal-li Uijongbu SEOUL Chuktun-ni Kap’yong Ch’unch’on Chip’yong-ni Yangp’yong TO HONGCH’ON X X X X X X I IX X X X X X X IX X X X 3 25 3 25 X X ROK 6 Mar XX 3 25 3 25 XX 24 ROK 6 LINE NEVADA LINE LINE LINE NEVADA GOLDEN NO NAME XXXXX III PLA XXXXX IX PLA XXXXX XIII PLA XXXXX XIX PLA MILES 0 15 Forward Positions, Evening, 30 Apr The Chinese Spring Offensive, 1951. (Based on U.S. Army Center of Military History map.) [18.221.187.121] Project MUSE (2024-04-24 13:19 GMT) 182 PASSING THE TEST Forward Artillery Support: Task Force Lindy Lou, 4–21 May 1951 In U.S. IX Corps the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, after supporting the ROK 6th and 1st Marine Divisions during the opening days of the Chinese Spring Offensive, was given the initial mission of providing artillery support to the newly arrived ROK 2d Division, which was inserted into the line between the ROK 6th Division on the east and the U.S. 24th Infantry Division on the west. Because of the unique nature of the artillery grouping, called Task Force Lindy Lou, a combat historian, 1st Lt. Martin Blumenson , prepared a report on its operations. He describes the establishment of the task force. Task force organizations appear to offer particular opportunities to the interview-historian. Organized for a specific mission and generally comprising elements of several units, the task force upon dissolution does not always record in a formal manner its achievements and its problems as a unit. In order to remedy this situation and because a composite-type organization of artillery elements is rarely encountered, interviews on Task Force Lindy Lou were undertaken. Task Force Lindy Lou was formed 4 May 1951, under the command of Lt. Col. Leon F. Lavoie, the commanding officer of the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion. It consisted of Headquarters Battery and Battery A, 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion (155mm howitzers, M41, self-propelled), Battery A, 987th [Armored] Field Artillery Battalion (105mm howitzers [M7, self-propelled]), and Battery B, 27th ROK Field Artillery Battalion (105mm howitzers). The 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, was attached to render security...

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