Kontum: The Battle to Save South Vietnam

13. Cut Off and Surrounded

13 Cut Off and Surrounded Men, remember, there is no retreat from here. You must die where you stand. —Sir Colin Campbell to the 93rd British Highlanders, battle of Balaclava, 25 October 1854 Mr. Vann said that after the fall of Tan Canh and Dak To II the situation in Kontum was so serious and morale there was so low that if the NV A had brought 50 battery-powered tape recorders to play recordings of tank noises—grinding and clanking and motors revving up—over loudspeakers outside the city, the entire garrison and population would have fled in panic.1 In early May, General Abrams told his commanders, In the last few weeks, in my conversations with General Vien, and with the President, I’ve said it straight, and called it for what it was worth. Just the other day General Vien was telling me about some equipment they wanted, and I told him that we were doing everything we could to get this equipment to them and so on. But I then went on to tell him, I said, “Equipment is not what you need. You need men that will fight. And you need officers that will fight, and will lead the men.” I said, “No amount of equipment will change the situation. It’s in the hands of men, and if they’ll fight, and their officers will lead them, you’ve got—even today—you’ve got all the equipment you need.” I said, “That’s the trouble.” I said, “I don’t think you’ve lost a tank to enemy fire. You lost all the tanks in the 20th because the men abandoned them, 154 • KONTUM led by the officers. You lost most of your artillery because it was abandoned and people wouldn’t fight.”2 On 7 May, Mr. Vann reported to General Abrams that his counterpart , Lieutenant General Dzu, had complained to him that he was being set up by President Thieu to be the scapegoat if Kontum fell. Dzu was certain he would be court-martialed when that happened. He went on to say that the coming losses would force Thieu to resign and that, in fact, Thieu’s wife and children were already in Switzerland. He saw a cease-fire as the only hope for South Vietnam. Vann punched a number of holes in Dzu’s theories but was unable to buck up his morale or attitude. However, after Polei Kleng, which was under assault at the time, held out through the night, Dzu became more positive and said that he would fend off the personal attacks by holding Kontum.3 Camp Le Khanh was a large, hilltop outpost about 22 kilometers west–northwest of Kontum on Highway 511. It was on a hill named “Polei Kleng,” so the Americans called it by that name. In May 1972, the 62nd Border Ranger Battalion commanded by Major Buu Chuyen manned it. His advisers were Captain Geddes MacLaren and Lieutenant Paul McKenna.4 US Special Forces had built Polei Kleng in June 1966, so it was well constructed and had an airfield. Ben Het, Dak Mot, Dak Pek, and Dak Seang, all farther northwest near the Cambodian border, were still holding out, and the NV A appeared to be bypassing them. However, the NV A had to take Polei Kleng because it controlled Highway 511, which the NV A needed for its attack on Kontum. From 24 April to 5 May, attacks by fire on the Ranger camps astride the NV A supply routes increased. The NV A moved anti-aircraft weapons close to Polei Kleng, and resupply or reinforcement by air became virtually impossible. Starting in early May the defenders were subjected to attacks by fire from 82-mm and 122-mm mortars.5 At 1530 on 5 May, the airborne TOWs were launched against T-54 tanks in the Polei Kleng area. The TOW crews sighted two enemy tanks from above but could not get a clear shot at them because, at the slant ranges from which they needed to fire, vegetation masked their view. Tactical air fighter-bombers were sent to bomb the tanks.6 At noon on 6 May, the bombardment of Polei Kleng increased until more than 50 rounds fell in an hour and a half. US tactical air strikes stopped the enemy fire until the FAC CUT OFF AND SURROUNDED • 155...