Kontum: The Battle to Save South Vietnam

10. A Debacle at Dak To

10 A Debacle at Dak To Under the command of Platoon Leader Nguyen Nhan Trien, tank number 377 plunged into a group of enemy [ARVN] tanks and destroyed them one after another. [His] combat team set a record knocking out five tanks in one battle in the Highlands theater. —History of the Central Highlands People’s Armed Forces in the Anti-U.S. War of Resistance for National Salvation The ARVN base at Dak To II was five kilometers due west of Tan Canh. There was a small airstrip on slightly higher ground to the north and a steep mountain north of the airfield. The 22nd ARVN Division’s 47th Regiment defended this base. Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Brownlee Jr. was the regimental senior adviser. His deputy was Captain Charles H. Carden. The regimental CP, most of the regiment’s 1st Battalion, and part of the 9th Airborne Battalion were at Dak To II. C Company of the regiment’s 1st Battalion was well to the south, and the remainder of the airborne battalion was to the north–northeast. The 47th Regiment’s 2nd Battalion was north–northwest of Dak To II. Nine kilometers to the west–southwest of Dak To II was FSB 6, manned by the 1st Company of the 72nd Ranger Battalion and one platoon from the 1st Company, 3rd Battalion, 42nd Regiment, the regiment whose headquarters and other battalions were at Tanh Canh. Seven kilometers almost due south of Dak To II was FSB 5, manned by the remainder of the 72nd Ranger Battalion and one company of the 3rd Battalion, 42nd Regiment. The remainder of the 3rd Battalion was 13 road kilometers away at Dien Binh on Highway 14. As at Tan Canh, this hodgepodge of intermixed units at widely A DEBACLE AT DAK TO • 115 separated locations violated the principle of unity of command, and the many small outlying positions were more vulnerable than fewer, larger troop concentrations would be. However, there may have been other considerations for this configuration. For example, after spending years at the same base, the troops there would know the territory, and something would be lost by moving them to consolidate units. The airborne battalion could be withdrawn at any time, so it was better to spread the paratroops among the various locations. Also, the airborne troops were more likely than the other ARVN soldiers to aggressively patrol out from their bases, and by doing so they might stiffen the other defenders’ spines. Nevertheless , the best that can be said for such a complex disposition of troops is that it might confuse the NV A intelligence officers trying to determine where the various ARVN units were located.1 Toward the end of March, there were several unsuccessful sapper attacks against Dak To II. In early April, the NV A established a position north of the airstrip with about 200 men, recoilless rifles, and .51-caliber anti-aircraft guns—all dug in. They scored 11 hits on a VNAF chopper carrying Colonel Kaplan, Colonel Dat, and some of the Vietnamese staff. One .51-caliber round blew the door gunner’s head to pieces. The NV A was issuing a challenge with this move, but the 22nd Division’s response was ineffectual. For five days, the 47th Regiment tried to drive out the NV A troops in this position by using three battalions of infantry, tanks, and 10,000 rounds of artillery fire. All that harassment finally wore down the NV A, so they packed up and left. The 47th should have wiped out that much smaller enemy force in a day. Kaplan considered the regimental commander, Colonel Minh, totally inept at using his 14 512 Dak To II Colonel Brownee last seen here Kontum 30km Tan Canh The battles at Tan Canh and Dak To II. 116 • KONTUM available firepower and called this encounter, “the worst example of leadership I have ever seen anyplace.” Both Dat and Kaplan thought Colonel Minh incompetent, and they finally managed to get him relieved a few days before the main NV A attack.2 A POW from the 400th NV A Sapper Regiment, who was captured on 6 April, said two of his regiment’s battalions, K3 and K37, were operating in the Tan Canh/Dak To area. He also revealed that four or five of the 320th NV A Infantry Division’s battalions had suffered so many...