Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America’s Entry into World War I

6. Tensions with Germany and Britain: January–September 1916

6 Tensions with Germany and Britain January–September 1916 Before Wilson joined the preparedness crusade, he faced a major challenge : Britain’s arming of merchant ships. The practice, accepted in international law, had begun over a century earlier. A merchantman would have a small gun on deck to ward off pirates or “privateers,” that is, private vessels that governments commission in wartime to attack enemy ships. The German navy had long contended that submarines could not safely surface and warn armed merchantmen before sinking them. In mid-November 1915 a U-boat captured a copy of secret British instructions; these orders confirmed long-held suspicions that armed commercial vessels were obligated to pursue submarines, then destroy them. German press coverage of the diplomatic correspondence between Berlin and London over the Baralong incident of August 1915, in which Britain denied any wrongdoing, further inflamed national sentiment. During the first months of the war, the State Department classified merchantmen , even if armed, as by definition involved in peaceful tasks and thereby immune from attack. Until the summer of 1915, when the British Admiralty began arming ships that voyaged to the United States, the issue remained abstract. On September 12, Lansing informed Wilson that the British steamer Waimana, which carried a 4.7-inch gun, had entered Newport News, Virginia, to take on a load of coal. Such armament, the secretary argued, was no longer “clearly defensive”; it “may now be employed for offensive operations against so small and unarmored a craft as a submarine.” As even ocean liners engaged in the practice of search-and-destroy, it was difficult “to demand that a submarine shall give warning and so expose itself to 155 156 Nothing Less Than War the heavy guns carried by some of the British passenger vessels.” Henceforth, the United States should treat such craft as warships.1 The president appeared sympathetic to Lansing’s argument, remarking to House: “It is hardly fair to ask Submarine commanders to give warning by summons if, when they approach as near as they must for that purpose they are to be fired upon.” In a note to Wilson on January 2, 1916, after the suspected torpedoing of the armed British liner Persia, the secretary urged the administration to revise its rules quickly, positing that Germany had a good case. Ambassador Gerard concurred, finding it absurd that “a submarine must come to the surface, give warning, offer to put passengers and crew in safety, and constitute itself a target for merchant ships.”2 In a memo dated January 7, Lansing advanced a diplomatic initiative that could have changed the entire nature of the war. Allied merchantmen should either disarm or risk being treated by the enemy as warships and hence subject to immediate sinking. In return, the Central Powers would observe normal rules of cruiser warfare, that is, they would agree to rescue all people on board and launch torpedoes only after giving warning.3 Lansing assumed both sides would back his proposal. German U-boats would no longer face enemy fire. Allied craft would be spared underwater attack. American citizens and ships could safely cross the Atlantic. Such a policy might foster peace with Germany as well as pleasing a Congress that hoped the entire submarine issue would disappear. At first Wilson welcomed Lansing’s scheme. Britain, he claimed, was “going beyond the spirit” of maritime practice by using guns for offensive purposes. On February 16, the president wrote House, then in London negotiating the House-Grey memorandum. Disarming merchant ships, claimed the president, would leave the Germans without excuse “to throw off all restraints in under-sea warfare. . . . We are amazed the English do not see this opportunity to gain a great advantage without losing anything.”4 On January 18, Lansing, with Wilson’s backing, submitted his modus vivendi to the Allies. The United States, he threatened, was seriously considering treating armed merchantmen as auxiliary cruisers, hence no longer recognizing their immunity from attack.5 London was appalled, fearing that the proposal would have legalized the wholesale sinking of merchant ships. British vessels would be deprived of a defense that the United States itself had formerly held legitimate. In a memorandum to the cabinet, Grey accused the United States of attempting to readjust “the balance of sea power in favour of our enemies.”6 Tensions with Germany and Britain 157 When, on January 29, the secretary’s proposal reached the...