Notes
Notes 1. Rational Choice, Area Expertise, and Democratic Transition in Developing Societies 1. For a concise summary of criticisms of rational choice approaches to the third world, see Little (1991). 2. Of course, the role of political elites has already been studied extensively in the context of political development and democratization (e.g., Dahl 1971; Huntington 1984; Przeworski 1992; Rustow 1970; Valenzuela 1992; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; and Burton, Gunther, and Higley 1992, just to name a few). 3. I do not claim that this is the first set of good rational-choice applications to real-world events. By now there are many, including early applications, such as Popkin 1979; Bates 1981; Bates 1988; Bates 1989; and Geddes 1991. 2. Kims’ Dilemma and the Politics of Rivalry 1. For the historical background in this section, I am heavily indebted to Han Sung-joo (1990), Kihl (1988), Sohn (1989), and “The Agitating 80s,” a special series by the Munhwa Broadcasting Company (1990). 2. Kihl 1988, 20–21. In February of 1986, the Haitian dictator, Jean-Claude Duvalier, went into exile while the Portuguese president was elected by the general public for the first time in sixty years. In the same month, Marcos was ousted and Corazon Aquino was sworn in as the president of the Philippines. In 1987, the Soviet Communist Party adopted secret voting while the Taiwanese government lifted the thirty-eight-year-old martial law. 3. Although it is a very plausible one, given the two Kims’ past histories (which affects their subsequent preferences), Assumption 1 is not necessary for the argument I make in this chapter. It is adopted here mainly for simplicity of illustration. 4. The construction of Equations 1, 2, and 3 is not an attempt to assign exact numerical values to these equations and, thus, the outcomes they represent . These equations should be seen as heuristic devices that help us to establish Kim1’s ordinal preference between the (Stay, Stay) outcome and the (Resign, Stay) outcome. That is, they make it easier to make a reasonable conclusion about which outcome was preferred by each Kim. We are not interested in, and cannot determine, how much one outcome was preferred to the other. 114 Notes to Pages 14–29 5. For details of this strategy, see International Herald Tribune, November 11, 1987, and Lee Young-suk (1992). The information on the distribution of eligible voters was borrowed from Kihl (1988, 17). 6. Since the three events of Kim1 winning, Kim2 winning, and Roh winning were collectively exhaustible (there were only three realistically possible outcomes of the 1987 presidential election), Pss/1 , Pss/2 ,and Pss/3 should sum up to 1. Therefore, each Kim’s assigning high value to Pss/1 (assessing his own chance of winning as being very high) means very low values for Pss/2 and Pss/3 . 7. The details about the process and the outcome of the voting at the national convention of the New Democratic Party in 1970 came from Gang-shik Lee (1970) and Sang-woo Lee (1992). Kim Dae-jung went ahead and made an impressive showing against the incumbent president, Park Chung-hee, in the presidential election of April 1971. He received 43.6 percent of the total votes cast, against Park’s 51.2 percent. President Park’s majority, allowing for regional factors, was a mere 0.2 percent of the total votes cast, even with all the money and administrative power he mobilized. It is widely believed that Kim Dae-jung’s strong showing against President Park contributed to Park’s decision to abandon the direct presidential election altogether, a tradition inherited by Chun Doohwan . For an excellent analysis of the 1971 presidential election (and the history of authoritarian rule in Korea), see Sohn (1989, 30–45). 8. In the election of 1987, there were no provinces where Kim Dae-jung received more than 13 percent of the total votes cast, outside of Cholla provinces and the Seoul-Kyonggi region, where he was particularly strong. As a result, he finished last among the three primary candidates in all the provinces except his native Cholla provinces and the capital city of Seoul. 3. Building a New Party System 1. For Korea’s new electoral system, see Brady and Mo (1992) and Cheng and Tallian (1995). 2. Han Dong-yun 1990, 168–169. Regionalism has been a dominant social cleavage in Korea since Park Chung-hee came to power in a military coup in 1961. Under...
OR
