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The purpose of this chapter is to determine what the government of the People’s Republic of China expects from Russia, vis-à-vis Taiwan, and to what extent Moscow’s current policy and behavior meet those expectations. Regrettably, the Chinese leadership has not yet published a white paper on the topic, so answers must be divined from other sources. As a starting point for collecting and analyzing evidence on the topic, this chapter assumes that China’s policy toward Taiwan rests on the following logic: 1. For the PRC leadership, preserving and protecting China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity are matters of national and regime survival. Therefore, maintaining the viability of unification between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland is a top priority of China’s foreign and domestic policy at all times.1 2. Unification will become unviable if Taiwan changes its international status in such a way as to sever permanently its connection to the Chinese nation; this is the meaning of “Taiwan independence.” Therefore, “Taiwan independence” must be prevented at all cost. 3. Taiwan’s international isolation makes Taiwan independence infeasible. Therefore, Beijing should maximize Taiwan’s isolation, both by preventing it from gaining membership in international organizations and by requiring China’s diplomatic partners to accept Beijing’s view of Taiwan’s status (there is but one China, Taiwan is part of China, and the sole legal government of China is the PRC). 4. A primary obstacle to the achievement of unification (and the eradication of the Taiwan independence threat) lies in the United States’ policy of enabling effective deterrent and defense capabilities for Taiwan. Therefore, to eliminate the danger of Taiwan independence and secure unification, China must increase its power relative to both Taiwan and the United States. 11 The Taiwan Issue and the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership The View from Beijing Shelley Rigger The Taiwan Issue and the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership 313 Given this logic, Beijing’s expectations regarding Russia’s Taiwan policy can be divided into five components. First, like all countries that wish to establish normal diplomatic ties with China, Russia must adopt a correct political and rhetorical approach to the Taiwan issue. It must acknowledge the one China principle, and it must oppose Taiwan independence. In addition, although this is not a requirement for normalized relations, China prefers that Russia assign blame for instability in the Taiwan Strait to Taiwan and its protector, the United States. Second, China expects Russia to adopt a correct relationship with Taiwan. Russia cannot have diplomatic relations with Taipei, nor should it sell weapons to Taiwan. Also, as we shall see, China has encouraged Russia to exercise restraint in its economic and substantive ties with Taiwan. Third, Beijing has revealed an expectation that Russia will support China ’s global strategic orientation. China has encouraged Russia to join an alliance , or at least to conclude a formal agreement that ensures friendly relations between Moscow and Beijing. Internationally, China prefers multilateralism and the UN system to unilateralism and hegemonism, and it strongly opposes separatist movements. It has sought Russia’s endorsement of these principles. The two nations have agreed to strengthen regional cooperation, including through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. A fourth element of China’s policy involves military cooperation. China ’s actions reveal a preference for a Russian policy toward arms sales and military-technological cooperation that will assist China’s military modernization . Beijing shows particular interest in persuading Russia to sell weapons and transfer technology and know-how that will help China develop weapons systems and tactical capabilities to deter or defeat both Taiwan and the United States in the event of armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait. In addition to acquiring weapons and military technology from Russia, China has shown a keen interest in carrying out joint military exercises with Russia, especially exercises designed to demonstrate China’s resolve and capability to counter Taiwan independence. We can discern these four elements by looking at Beijing’s rhetoric and behavior toward Russia. In addition, I will argue that China has an interest in encouraging Russia to commit itself to intervene on China’s behalf in the event of a Taiwan Strait conflict. This desire does not rise to the level of an expectation, and there is little evidence to suggest that Russia has made such a commitment. Not least because the goal is unlikely to be achieved, Beijing does not express it openly, either in public statements or in its behavior . Nonetheless, I will argue that...

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