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Introduction The development and steady upgrading of Russian-Chinese ties during the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin meant that Russia had to devise a framework for its interactions with Taiwan that was acceptable to China. At the same time, the nature of Russia’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—most specifically the transfer of weaponry—had an impact on China’s interactions with Taiwan, as well as the structural dynamics of the cross-Straits crisis. This chapter examines Russian foreign policy toward the China-Taiwan issue. The first section sets forward a chronological account of Russia’s interactions with Taiwan and with China on the Taiwan issue. Then I briefly assess the extent of Russia’s bilateral communications with Taiwan and their significance. The last section analyzes Moscow’s perspective on the China-Taiwan issue. It is my contention that Russian foreign policy on this topic exhibits fundamental tensions that are inherent to Russia’s overall relationship with China. The cross-Straits conflict between China and Taiwan is, in certain respects, highly advantageous to Russia. However, the intensification of ties between Russia and China in the 2000s has taken place against the backdrop of the rise of China as a global presence. The Russian leadership is faced with the challenge of negotiating a course of action in its relationship with China which ensures that it does not inadvertently become ensnared as a participant in a conflict in a region in which it has no substantive interests. Sino-Soviet Relations and the Taiwan Issue The Taiwan issue emerged as one of the many factors that contributed to the 10 China, Russia, and the Taiwan Issue The View from Moscow Jeanne L. Wilson 294 Jeanne L. Wilson rift between the Soviet Union and the PRC in the 1950s. The opening of the Soviet archives has provided evidence to indicate, contrary to many previous Western assessments, that the Soviet Union was not opposed to the initial Chinese bombardment of the offshore islands held by the Republic of China (ROC) in 1958.1 However, the Soviet leadership, as with its Chinese counterpart , did not anticipate the vigor of the U.S. response, and was decidedly uninterested in becoming drawn into a military confrontation with the United States. By one account, Nikita Khrushchev even went so far as to suggest to Mao Zedong that China simply accept Taiwan’s independence.2 In a 1959 meeting with Mao, Khrushchev was blunt about the limits of Soviet support, noting that although the Soviet Union would promise to defend China for outside consumption, “between us, in a confidential way, we say that we will not fight over Taiwan.”3 As the Sino-Soviet conflict intensified, the level of hostility between the Soviet Union and Taiwan declined, with the two sides making several overtures toward each other.4 Such activities indicated more of an effort to engage the attentions of the United States or China than a genuine desire to establish any sort of relationship. Sustained interactions between the Soviet Union and Taiwan did not commence until the late 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev’s assumption of leadership in the Soviet Union coincided with the movement toward democratization on Taiwan. Under these circumstances, both states showed an interest in expanding bilateral contacts. By 1990, a steady stream of Soviet visitors began turning up in Taiwan, including some high-ranking politicians (although in an unofficial capacity).5 Nonetheless, the Gorbachev administration officially took a cautious approach to Taiwan, largely due to its concerns over alienating the PRC. Gorbachev ’s May 1989 visit to Beijing resulted in the normalization of relations between the two states, laying to rest a quarrel of three decades. Article 11 of the “Sino-Soviet Joint Communiqué” emphasized that the Soviet Union supported China’s position that Taiwan was “part and parcel of the territory of the PRC.”6 Subsequently, China made it clear that Soviet interactions with Taiwan should remain of a strictly nonofficial nature, subject to Beijing’s approval. The Chinese Foreign Ministry regularly registered complaints regarding the trips of Soviet political figures to Taiwan (a reflection of the erosion of mechanisms of state control) and pressured the Soviet authorities to prohibit corresponding visits of Taiwanese politicians. Thus, Moscow did not reciprocate after Taiwan lifted restrictions on direct trade in March 1990 and was resistant to Taiwanese efforts to set up bilateral representative offices connected with economic and cultural affairs.7 [3.145.130.31] Project MUSE (2024-04-23...

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