The Future of China-Russia Relations

Russia and China in Central Asia

Conceptualizing Russian and Chinese relations with Central Asia is a difficult task. The leaderships of these two major powers approach foreign policy in largely realist terms, seeking to maximize their power, jealously guarding their national sovereignty, and engaging in balancing against a superior adversary . Yet neither country fully fits the standard realist model in its foreign policy behavior. Russia had been a power in decline, until Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials found that energy resources gave their country far more leverage in world politics than military power, the old Soviet staple. China is a rising power, but its foreign policy has been oriented toward preserving the status quo, fostering the conditions for strong economic growth and social stability domestically. Both Russia and China have become strong advocates of multilateral organizations, from regional groupings like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Collective Security Treaty Organization to the United Nations on a global scale. Surprisingly, these two powers have found their interests coincide remarkably well in Central Asia, at least in the short term. Russia and China are now aligned together against a hegemonic United States that seeks both to preserve stability and to transform the political landscape of Central Asia. Moscow and Beijing perceive these two goals as contradictory, and have opted to support repressive Central Asian regimes as the best hedge against the new security threats of terrorism and extremism. This chapter will explicate Chinese and Russian interests in and policy toward Central Asia. I address the various elements in Russian and Chinese relations with the countries of post-Soviet Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan), examine the roles of China and Russia in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other regional groupings, and assess the implications of Chinese and Russian policies and activities in Central Asia for U.S. national interests. The chapter first considers political and security issues, then turns to the various forms of eco8 Russia and China in Central Asia Charles E. Ziegler 234 Charles E. Ziegler nomic cooperation and rivalry in the region, particularly in energy. Finally, I assess the important role of diaspora politics and population issues for Russia, China, and Central Asia. Political and Security Issues Relations with Central Asia in the 1990s were not central to Russian foreign policy. The reformers affiliated with Boris Yeltsin who dominated politics regarded the former republics as an unnecessary burden on Russia, politically and economically. Central Asian elites tended to mirror this perspective.1 Integration through the Commonwealth of Independent States and its affiliated organizations stalled early on. Moscow frequently adopted a neo-imperial posture toward its former republics, but the state clearly lacked the military or economic capability to implement policies abroad, as the first Chechen venture (1994–1995) demonstrated. Russia’s influence reached a new low in 1998–1999 with the collapse of the ruble and Moscow’s inability to counter NATO’s campaign against the Serbs. Vladimir Putin was clearly a stronger leader than Boris Yeltsin, but his “restoration” of Russian power was aided by developments largely beyond the new president’s control. Oil prices surged from a low of about $12 per barrel in 1998 to over $140 per barrel in 2008, resulting in a windfall for the Russian treasury. Russia’s economy posted record growth rates, even if the growth was somewhat uneven. Russian nationalism and confidence grew as the United States became bogged down in Iraq, without first stabilizing Afghanistan. Putin enhanced Russia’s position by effectively wielding the energy and infrastructure levers to enhance Russian influence in Central Asia (and in the western and Caucasian republics), while strengthening the “power vertical” and concentrating authority in the hands of the executive. Since Putin’s successor, Dmitry Medvedev, served as chairman of the board of Gazprom, Russia’s largest energy company, he too is likely to appreciate the critical role of energy in ties with Central Asia, and in Russian foreign policy more broadly. China’s regional policy toward Central Asia, and indeed its foreign policy more broadly, experienced a transformation nearly as sweeping. In the early 1990s Beijing’s focus was largely regional, with most of its attention devoted to Taiwan and the western Pacific. China was only beginning to appreciate the implications of globalization and its growing role in the world’s economy. Deng Xiaoping had rejected Mao Zedong’s revolutionary activism, and instead crafted a pragmatic policy of concentrating on internal development Russia and China...