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583  26  “Enough to Drive You Mad” In the first two and a half months of SHAEF’s existence, problems fell into two distinct categories: those under the purview of the CCS, and those that devolved on Eisenhower’s commands. At the end of March, Eisenhower believed his headquarters was well on the road toward accomplishing its essential tasks: forming a supreme headquarters and lesser staffs and mastering all the details of organization, the assignment of personnel, and the vast problems of moving troops and supplies. “The matters that have really caused us trouble,” he noted in his diary, “are those in which only the Combined Chiefs of Staff can make final decisions.” He listed three: the allocation of resources and whether and when to launch Anvil; the organization and command of the air forces; and political matters, especially pertaining to the French.1 Unless the chiefs could come together, the Overlord ship might never sail. Hammering Away on Anvil Aside from the operational value he attached to Anvil as a complement to Overlord, Eisenhower pointed to other considerations. As he explained to Marshall on 17 January, “according to my understanding the British and American staffs at Teheran definitely assured the Russians that ANVIL would take place. Secondly, we have put into the French Army a very considerable investment. Since these troops, plus the Americans and the British, cannot profitably be used in decisive fashion in Italy, we must open a gateway for them into France or all of our French investment will have been wasted. Altogether there would be a great number of American and other forces locked up in the Mediterranean from whom we will be deriving no benefit.” There was another factor he omitted: 584  BEETLE Marseilles, France’s largest prewar port, and Toulon offered alternative points of entry for manpower and materiel coming into the theater.2 Whatever the advantages, by 6 February the British restated their opposition to Anvil. On 26 January the BCOS had agreed to the concept of Anvil on the condition it contained two divisions, but by 6 February it became clear the Allies would not possess the requisite landing craft to mount concurrent operations in northern and southern France. As Smith pointed out, the difference of opinion never followed national lines. Cunningham , now first sea lord, sided with Eisenhower, while Smith emerged as the leading doubting Thomas in the American camp. Smith felt Anvil would deflect scarce Allied resources, especially for the vital buildup phase before the lodgments became secure. Intimately involved in assessing the landing craft issue, Smith concluded the strategic debate would necessarily come down to lift, and there was not enough for both operations . Something had to give, and that something had to be the southern France operation: Anvil’s demise, its downgrading to a threat, or a delay. On 6 February Smith received a study from the combined planners in Washington that floored him. Based on their calculations, enough landing craft would become available by 31 May for a seven-division Overlord and a two-division Anvil. This flew in the face of everything his own people had told him and set off another hurried exchange of communications between London and Washington. As Marshall noted, the “battle of numbers” greatly confused the entire puzzle. To Eisenhower, Marshall marveled at the turn of events. “The British and American Chiefs of Staff seem to have completely reversed themselves,” he wrote, “and we have become Mediterraneanites and they heavily pro-OVERLORD.” Attesting to his continued support, Marshall still wondered if “localitis ” had “not warped [Eisenhower’s] judgment.”3 A deflated Eisenhower confided in his diary, “looks like ANVIL is doomed. I hate this.”4 Smith and Handy held marathon telephone exchanges on 8–9 February , trying to narrow the numbers gap. The combined planners in Washington, in Smith’s view, badly underestimated the initial force requirements and overestimated the lift capacities of infantry landing craft. SHAEF operated on the basis of division slices, not just combat troops. Divisional assault scales called for 25,000 men, not the 15,000 assumed in Washington. This meant that, according to SHAEF calculations , a seven-division operation called for a lift of 175,000 men, not 105,000. The Washington planners, based on experience in the Pacific, figured on three trips per vessel with 1,400 men in each wave; the London planners’ calculated on two trips and 960 men. In addition, calculations for the assault scales did not provide for the immediate buildup...

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