The 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam: Unparalleled and Unequaled

Chapter 11: The Division Rotates Home

The Division Rotates Home In June, the 9th Division received word that it was to rotate to the United States, and units began to prepare to stand down. The 2nd Brigade terminated operations on 4 July; the 1st Brigade on 23 July; and on 26 July, the 3rd Brigade went under operational control of II Field Force, Vietnam. From its entry into the Mekong Delta in February 1967 until July 1969, the 9th Infantry Division had been an effective fighting unit developing tactics and techniques, from riverine to Night Search operations , to meet the ever-changing Viet Cong and NVA initiatives. The 9th Division soldiers in this period distinguished themselves by their outstanding performance of duty and their extraordinary heroism in action against enemy forces. Operating by air, water, and land, they successfully overcame the extremely hazardous and difficult Delta terrain and inflicted defeat after defeat upon an elusive enemy, substantially advancing the cause of pacification. A review of the 9th Division’s operations in this thirty-month period, which were directed toward improving the security of the Delta and enhancing the GVN’s pacification program, is in order. Initially, the aggressiveness of the division, the first and only American combat infantry units to operate in the densely populated Delta, surprised the enemy. In 1977 the riverine brigade ranged far and wide on the Delta’s waterways—attacking the enemy, which was ill prepared to defend against riverine tactics—and the 1st Brigade policed the vital People’s Road and its surrounding territory, inflicting substantial losses on the VC. Notwithstanding their losses, the VC were able to fully reconstitute their units in preparation for the first phase of North Vietnam’s General Offensive and General Uprising Campaign, which began on Chapter 11 The Division Rotates Home 151 31 January 1968, the day of the important Tet national holiday. This was a major COSVN offensive, and the VC attacked and temporarily occupied parts of Saigon and all the major cities of the Delta. The division ’s versatile tactical mobility allowed it to move expeditiously to the besieged areas by road, air, and water and forcibly root out the enemy which suffered serious losses, particularly among the previously hidden VC infrastructure, whose members had to surface in order to support the attacks. The Tet Offensive was a failure in that the VC gained no territory and there had been no uprising by the Vietnamese people in the Delta. However, the North Vietnamese gained great cachet in the world press. The Communists, buoyed by the spin on their Tet Offensive, decided to quickly reconstitute their forces and to strike again at Saigon from its vulnerable southern area. Although in the three months succeeding Tet the VC were unable to fully reconstitute their units, they nevertheless massed again for an attack on Saigon in early May 1968. This second phase of the “General Offensive” (Mini-Tet) was also a complete failure. The division’s 3rd Brigade successfully contained the attack so not a single VC unit reached Saigon proper. The Communists’ Central Committee assessed phases 1 and 2 and found they were abortive and that they had committed an error in strategy.1 VC losses were substantial in these two offenses, and they had not only not gained any additional control of the population but they had managed to alienate the Vietnamese so that the people wanted to be able to better protect themselves. Thus the concept of the People Self Defense Force (PSDF) was initiated. The end of May 1968 was the apogee of Communist influence in the Delta; from here on out the Communists began to lose the tug-of-war for population control. Again the VC retreated to their base areas. By the summer, the division was becoming much more effective in rooting out VC units located in their previously sacrosanct base areas. COSVN, with its credo of the offensive, was not to be deterred, and it again planned to attack Saigon from the south in the early fall. The 1st Brigade, utilizing jitterbugging and seal-and-pile-on tactics, crushed the enemy’s third offensive, again inflicting serious losses. The tide had definitely turned in the war in the Upper Delta. Not only was the enemy on the run, but the GVN had greatly expanded and upgraded 152 The 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam its Regional and Popular Forces. The PSDF had grown rapidly in 1968 and 1969...