The 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam: Unparalleled and Unequaled

Chapter 9: Pacification Results

Pacification Results The endgame was pacification, and the success of the 9th Division can be measured by not only its combat results but also the improvements of the GVN pacification program. Of great importance was that the GVN won the “rice war.” The improved security prevented the Viet Cong from appropriating appreciable supplies, and, after the major disruption of the Communist General Offensive in 1968, agricultural production improved from a low point of 84 percent of the index based upon the 1961–1965 period to 94 percent in 1969 and 103 percent in 1970. The rice output in the Delta continued to grow, and in 1973 agricultural production was 115 percent of what it had been in the base period.1 It was heartening to see heavy traffic on the main routes and farmers ’ vehicles carrying squeaking pigs and squawking chickens on the secondary roads where just a year previously nothing traveled because of VC interdictions. Unquestionably, the economy of the Delta was improving greatly. Probably the best way to measure pacification progress is to view the results of the Hamlet Evaluation Surveys in the 9th Division’s tactical area of responsibility, which, commencing in June 1968, included the four Northern Delta provinces of Long An, Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, and Go Cong. The VC/NVA initiated their General Offensive and General Uprising campaign to rally the South Vietnamese population to the Communist side. As is shown in table 8, in the 9th Division TAOR, even after his first two major offenses, the enemy had failed to increase population control. In June 1968, the division had consolidated at Dong Tam, divested itself of most static missions, established fire support bases in the heart of VC territory, and implemented its new tactical concepts. Subsequently, its tactical successes decimated Chapter 9 142 The 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam the VC/NVA main and local force units, thereby allowing the GVN process of pacification to accelerate. Consequently, the VC lost control of much of the Upper Delta’s population. Over 420,000 people were freed from VC control (see table 19). Prior to the 1968 Tet Offensive, the VC controlled 62 percent (1,061) of the 1,720 hamlets in the area. By the end of July 1969, when the division rotated home, 23 percent (398) were still under VC control, and that number was diminishing rapidly. Reviewing the other side of the ledger, in this same period GVN control of hamlets increased from 179 to 408, and the population under GVN influence increased by more than 410,000 people. The results could have been even greater, because with the rapid expansion of the GVN into the less secure areas of the countryside, the civil services of the government were unable to keep pace with the gains made by the combined U.S. and Vietnamese military forces. At the time the loss of control of over 660 hamlets and 420,000 inhabitants resulted in irreparable damage to VC efforts; the VC were no longer able to impress young men or to have the villagers prepare positions or carry supplies. More important, the VC capabilities to commandeer rice and other essential items necessary to support their guerrilla activities were greatly reduced. As a consequence, the fourth phase of the Communists’ General Offensive and General Uprising collapsed and was a dismal failure. Notwithstanding this outstanding success, the tug-of-war was still ongoing in the contested hamlets, where several hundred thousand Province Hamlets Population 13 January 1968 31 July 1969 31 January 1968 13 July 1969 Dinh Tuong 350 192 230,642 120,251 Kien Hoa 352 82 258,830 71,851 Go Cong 77 15 40,210 1,278 Long An 282 109 132,268 45,700 Total 1,061 398 661,950 239,080 Table 19. Viet Cong Population Control, Hamlet Evaluation Survey, “V” Rated Source: Hamlet Evaluation Survey Pacification Results 143 people lived. However, now that the VC/NVA main and local force units had been severely mauled, the GVN continued successfully to pacify the countryside so that by the end of 1972, there were no VC controlled hamlets in the Upper Delta. Despite the great success of the division’s pacification efforts, there were some who decried the collateral damage resulting from military operations . If one considers that the 9th Division was required to evict the VC from the major urban areas of Saigon—My Tho, Can Tho...