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The General Offensive and General Uprising In 1967, the Communists assumed that the RVNAF and Allied Forces were weak and could be defeated so they abandoned their limited offensive tactics and adopted the concept of large battles, generally conducted by main force units. Thus, the Communists changed their tactics from company- and platoon-sized or smaller operations to battles conducted with multibattalion attacks. For example, on 10 December 1967, at An Naut Tan, the 2/60 Infantry was attacked by the 2nd Independent Battalion supported by the 506th Battalion and the 5th Nha Be Battalion. Hanoi subsequently decided to implement the “General Offensive and General Uprising” plan of the war in 1967–1969. The offensive was to be conducted throughout South Vietnam in several phases by Viet Cong main force units attacking cities and U.S. and RVNAF military units and installations. The Communists believed that with tactical victories, the people of South Vietnam would rally behind the Communist cause, thus leading to the overthrow of the government, the so-called General Uprising. First Phase of the VC/NVA General Offensive, Tet The first phase of the Communist General Offensive was launched on 30 January 1968, when the enemy breached its self-declared Tet holidays cease-fire to launch countrywide, all-out attacks against provincial and district capitols and U.S. and GVN military installations. A significant change in these attacks by the Communists was the use of daylight assaults on their targets to include major cities. Using these tactics, they sustained heavy losses; however, they entrenched themselves in many built-up areas, terrorizing the populace and inflicting widespread damage to property. Obviously, the Viet Cong activities were designed Chapter 2 The General Offensive and General Uprising 13 to disrupt the economy, thus discrediting the GVN and convincing the population of VC control. In that respect, a main Communist goal was disruption of the major lines of communication, particularly in the rice-rich Delta regions, primarily Route 4, the People’s Road. In the III Corps area, the main attacks were conducted against Saigon (including Tan Son Nhut Air Base), Bien Hoa (including the air base), Long Binh (including II Field Force Headquarters), Tan An, and Xuan Loc. In the IV Corps area, the major attacks were on the cities of My Tho, Ben Tre, Can Tho, and Vinh Long. The 9th Infantry Division, as the major U.S. combat unit south of Saigon, aggressively countered these attacks over several weeks. It deployed units rapidly with minimum advance warning and demonstrated great flexibility by operating effectively in many different areas.1 The 4/39 Infantry Battalion and the 2/47 Mechanized Infantry Battalion initially provided security for the major U.S. military installations at Long Binh and Bien Hoa. However, on 2 February, the 4/39 Infantry air-mobilized to Nha Be to relieve the enemy pressure on Saigon from VC forces that withdrew to the outer edges of Saigon after the initial Tet attack. The 2/39 Infantry Battalion operating in Long An was OPCON to the 3rd Brigade and, with the 2/60 Infantry Battalion and the 3/39 Infantry Battalion, airmobiled to Ben Tre, the capital of Kien Hoa, where they successfully defended the city and swept it clean of the VC. Ultimately, the brigade was given the mission of opening the vital Highway 4 from My Tho to Cai Lay, which it did by extensive day-and-night ambushes and aggressive patrolling. On 31 January, the MRF was moved from its pre-Tet blocking position in western Dinh Tuong Province to My Tho in response to a multibattalion VC assault on that capital city. The MRF was made OPCON to the senior advisor IV Corp, who, incidentally, was Major General George S. Eckhardt, the initial commanding general of the newly activated 9th Division. In the summer of 1967, Maj. Gen. George G. O’Connor, formerly the assistant division commander, followed Eckhardt in command of the division. On 1 February, two battalions landed and attacked north from the My Tho River into the city, where they engaged the 261, 263, and 265 VC Battalions, which were occupying the city. After clearing My Tho, with the support of the 7th ARVN Division, two battalions of the 2nd Brigade were transported [3.133.79.70] Project MUSE (2024-04-24 20:43 GMT) 14 The 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam by helicopter and sent to assist the RVNAF in clearing Vinh Long. Finally, the 2nd Brigade moved to Can...

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