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11 IssuesofhorseandmuleLogisticsintheCivilWar Joseph W. A. Whitehorne Archaeologists, along with many others, are drawn to Civil War sites largely because of their association with compelling human events. It is natural to focus on human participants to further explain the course of a battle, the extent of an encampment, or the use of a building for medical purposes. The artifacts recovered that best assist with and reveal these interests are most sought after. Thus, every museum and display tends to feature large amounts of small arms ammunition, exploded ordnance parts, and soldiers’ accoutrements. Graphics accompanying the archaeological finds often consist of maps and paintings explaining and dramatizing the human activity. Rarely is it noted that at many of these places, there was at least one horse or mule for every fourmen.Thesourcesofmobilityandsupply,theseanimalsalsoleftartifacts,perhaps more prosaic but equally revealing about the military events that had attracted the archaeologist. Between 2010 and 2012, archaeological studies were conducted on lands included withintheencampmentoftheArmyoftheShenandoah, attacked bytheConfederate army of Gen. Jubal Early at the Battle of Cedar Creek, October 19, 1864. This research identified the extensive cavalry camp established by the 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt (see Geier and Wood, chapter 8, this volume), that lay on the right flank of the larger Union encampment. The interpretation of site remains required a broader understanding of the support systems existing in the U.S. Cavalry in late 1864 that would have serviced the health of the cavalry horses, who were co-occupants of the site and whose status was vital to the operational capability of the cavalry troops. Questions to be addressed included types of horse care that mightberecognizedinthearchaeologyofthe1stDivision camp. Thatstudynurtured part of the following presentation. Very few students of the Civil War have paid sufficient attention to the logistical problems intrinsic to the animal-powered mobility of large nineteenth-century military forces. Civil War military leaders often were criticized by their political counterparts for the slowness of their deployment and movements to contact. Modern Joseph W. A. Whitehorne 178 historians have reiterated these negative views without investigating the reasons for the apparent lack of urgency, assuming that the contemporary critics were correct in calling the generals dilatory. An understanding of the limitations imposed by dependence on animal mobility is essential to fully comprehend, and sympathize with, the problems confronting generals and their planners, which often explain their apparent slowness. The scale of the war and the vast armies raised were beyond the prewar experience of all those involved. As such, it was a learning process for everyone. The side that most effectively resolved its mobility problems enjoyed an important advantage. Most infantry regiments began the war with the assumption that at least 25 wagons werenecessarytosustaintheminthefield.Themassivetrafficproblemsencountered, combined with the scarcity of animals and wagons, worked to reduce that figure to 6 for every thousand men by 1863. Wagon authorizations were reduced further, proportionally , as the size of regiments shrank. At the same time, there appeared new requirements to transport formally organized higher headquarters, larger supply requirements , and the new Ambulance Corps. It remained a logistical planner’s nightmare to ensure that the forces had adequate numbers of animals for tactical and supply purposes. The dimensions of the challenge can be seen by the fact that each full-strength cavalry regiment required 1,200 horses, while each artillery battery had to have 110 horses. Every animal required approximately 26 pounds of fodder and forage and 10 gallons of water daily (Stern 1961: 217). The magnitude of requirements may be seen further by the fact that between September 1864 and April 1865, the animals of the Army of the Potomac consumed 562,000 bushels of corn; 5,244,000 bushels of oats; and 54,442 tons of hay; and required 1,696 tons of straw. It was estimated that 75 wagons of grain per day were required to support the horses and mules used by Maj. Gen. George Meade’s army in the earlier Gettysburg Campaign. During the approach to that Pennsylvania town, planners also had to arrange for over 35,000 Union animals to have the daily opportunity to drink over 350,000 gallons of water without polluting human access. The estimated 83½ miles of men, animals, and rolling stock had to be coordinated for these needs to be met without eroding tactical cohesion en route. Given that it took over two hours to water each artillery battery, the difficulties involved in moving a large army are apparent, as is the drag such requirements...

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