The Abolition of Slavery in Ottoman Tunisia

7. The Aftermath of Abolition, 1846–1855

7 The Aftermath of Abolition, 1846–1855 When Ahmad Bey outlined the final abolition measures to Sir Thomas Reade in 1846, they did not embody recourse to religious authorities. Within four days of the declaration of abolition, strong public reaction forced the bey to confront the reality of slavery in its Muslim context. Slavery was recognized under Islamic law and regulated by the Sharia, and “to forbid what God permits is almost as great an offence as to permit what God forbids.”1 Without Sharia sanction, outright abolition of slavery and compulsory emancipation would have been contested. This chapter discusses the divergent responses of the al-Majlis alShar 'i to the emancipation edict justifying abolition. In addition to the fatwas issued by the council, the chapter examines the reactions of domestic intellectual, political, and economic establishments as well as ordinary Tunisians to the abolition of slavery and the emancipation decree . Here, the divergent responses and attitudes toward the emancipation decree are placed within the broader historical developments shaping the outlawing of the slave trade and the 1846 abolition of slavery. Religious Responses The Fatwa of the Hanafi Mufti One of the principal qadis of the Majlis who responded to Ahmad Bey’s edict was Muhammad Bayram III (1806–1861), the Shaykh al-Islam. He led the Hanafi rite in the Majlis to issue an impressive fatwa supporting  116 · The Abolition of Slavery in Ottoman Tunisia the edict.2 Although the precise date of this fatwa is unknown (Bin Diyaf , who documented both the abolition edict and Bayram’s fatwa, did not record the exact date), its timing suggests that it was issued two days after the bey sent the edict to the Majlis on 26 January.3 Muhammad Bayram III’s ideas on approbation and readiness for compliance informed his attitude to the emancipation decree. His fatwa began with the customary praise for the decree, describing it as al-maktub al-sharif (a noble letter), followed by assurance of his compliance with emancipation measures. He promised to instruct qadis and zawiyas under the Hanafi rite jurisdiction to execute the orders proscribed in the decree.4 Bayram went on to evaluate two of Ahmad’s key arguments to the Majlis: uncertain legal status and the risk to the maslaha arising from the increase in runaway slaves seeking protection at foreign consulates . Concerning the canonical doctrine of maslaha, Bayram agreed that the bey’s invocation of the principle of the public interest, although brief, was nonetheless conclusive: “ma 'ashartum 'ilayhi min al-maslaha fahimnahu ta tahaqqanahu.”5 For Bayram, the bey’s invocation of this Hanafi’s canonical principle was consistent with the circumstances the bey sought to prevent. Bayram then turned to the bey’s argument concerning “illegal enslavement ” of black slaves. Given the possibility that some slaves may have been Muslims, as Ahmad Bey argued, Bayram ruled that their enslavement contradicted the basic principle for enslavement.6 In cases where shaq (doubt) existed concerning religious status, the assumption should be in favor of freedom unless there was proof that the slave was not a Muslim. By right of birth every child of Adam was hurr (free). Thus the enslavement of a person of “uncertain” status was illegal, so it was incumbent on the public not to tamper with the Sharia by holding individuals from the bilad al-Sudan in bondage. Bayram’s fatwa did not stop here. He illustrated his ruling by citing Ahmad Baba’s treatise on illegal enslavement in west and central Sudan, arguing that anyone who was not convinced by the aforementioned legal implications arising from the ambivalent status of these black slaves should consult Ahmad Baba’s treatise.7 Bayram, a slave owner himself, was the first to comply with this ruling. He emancipated every slave in his estate, although it is unclear how much this was due to his own conscience or the bey’s persuasion.8 Thus Bayram’s final verdict encouraged emancipation, reiterating the same legal precedent that sustained the bey’s arguments. He affirmed The Aftermath of Abolition, 1846–1855 · 117 that given the shaky grounds upon which holding the Sudan (black slaves) as slaves rested, when added to its legal consequences, the wullat al-'amr’s (authorities’) consideration for preservation of maslaha, it is “befitting for a Muslim to abstain from this lawful act, but regrettable in consequence for the sake of his religion.” As the chief qadi of...