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10 How to Fill a Vacuum Chávez in the International Arena Jorge G. Castañeda Latin America today is a region of contradictions. Economically, the region as a whole has been enjoying its highest economic growth rates in three decades, thanks to sensible macroeconomic policies and high prices for commodities—copper, iron ore, soy, and hydrocarbons. At least until recently , this growth has been accomplished without inflation or internal imbalances . There are undoubted weaknesses—for example, a possible drop in raw materials prices, or the consequences of a prolonged recession in the United States—but the economic surge is real and significant. It has generated an undeniable reduction in poverty, a small but promising leveling of inequality, and, above all, a notable expansion of the lower-middle class, even in countries as historically unequal as Mexico and Brazil. Politically, the scenario is equally positive. The transitions to democracy of the 1980s have turned out to be lasting and profound. Except for the Cuban regime and the FARC in Colombia, all of the region’s political actors compete for power at the ballot box: even Hugo Chávez accepts his electoral defeats. Respect for human rights, while imperfect, is more established than ever before, and complaints are handled effectively and with accountability. Latin America is perhaps less important in the world than it was in the past, but to a large degree this is because it generates fewer problems. Why then is the region caught up in more diplomatic, political, and social conflicts than at any other time in recent history? Starting north and moving south, in Mexico we find extreme political polarization that has paralyzed the government since Felipe Calderón took office. Colombia is involved in a 152 Jorge G. Castañeda series of disputes with its neighbors—with Nicaragua over the island of San Andrés and maritime limits; growing animosity with Venezuela; disputes with Ecuador over border violations and environmental issues—as well as its ongoing internal armed conflict. Peru has clashed with Venezuela over the “Casas del ALBA” (centers developed to spread Bolivarian revolutionary ideology), and with Chile over maritime limits. Bolivia has seen its fragile central government threatened by secessionist tensions between the country ’s Eastern Provinces and the Altiplano; has argued with Argentina and Brazil over energy exports; and has continued its historic dispute with Chile over access to the sea. Argentina has endured a prolonged agricultural strike and social polarization, as well as an impasse with Uruguay over pollution from a paper mill on the border between these two countries. A Polarized Continent Analysts suggest many different explanations for the root causes of these conflicts, among them, the effects of narcotics trafficking and U.S. neglect. One factor stands out, however: the division of Latin America into two opposing factions. The first aligns itself generally with the “Washington Consensus ,” emphasizing representative democracy, the market economy, globalization , and cordial relations with the United States. The countries in this first group include Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil. The second faction favors participative democracy and rejects U.S. and capitalist models. It is led by Cuba and Venezuela, with important support in Mexico (López Obrador and the PRD), El Salvador (the FMLN), Nicaragua, Colombia (the FARC and part of the Polo Democrático), Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, and very probably Paraguay. The divisions are not always neat: elements of the first faction can be found in the heart of the second, and, in turn, many of its governments are under siege by forces financed, organized, and trained by the other side. Some countries—Argentina and, to a lesser degree, Guatemala—shift between one side and the other. There is nevertheless a fundamental asymmetry between the two factions: the followers and practitioners of macroeconomic orthodoxy, of the democracy formerly called “bourgeois,” and of understanding with Washington, even as governed by Bush, are timid, introverted, and cautious to an extreme (it was King Juan Carlos of Spain [18.117.152.251] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 11:01 GMT) How to Fill a Vacuum: Chávez in the International Arena 153 who famously told Chávez to “Shut up,” not Felipe Calderón, Álvaro Uribe, Alán García, Michelle Bachelet, Tabaré Vázquez, or Lula). Neither do these leaders feel a pressing need to export or expand their “model”: Brazil, for example, seeks greater influence in the region and in the world, but more for geopolitical motives than...

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