Sir Samuel Hood and the Battle of the Chesapeake

Introduction

Introduction The second battle of the Chesapeake (or the second battle of the Virginia Capes, as it is known in the United States) was fought on the fifth of September 1781. On the British side were the combined squadrons of Rear Admiral Sir Thomas Graves,1 Sir Samuel Hood, and Francis Samuel Drake.2 They faced a superior French fleet commanded by the comte de Grasse.3 The day’s action produced only an indecisive skirmish, yet it operated as a defeat for the British. Though they lost no ships, they had had two objectives when they sailed from New York: to defeat the French fleet and to relieve the besieged British army at Yorktown. The British had enjoyed naval superiority on the American coast since the start of the war and had used it in carrying out a number of successful amphibious operations. But the equivocal outcome at the Chesapeake left the French undefeated and the two objectives of the British thwarted, and its ultimate effect, the surrender at Yorktown, destroyed the government of Lord North. The battle carried no glory for the Royal Navy and became largely forgotten as the navy went on to better times starting with the Saintes and culminating with Trafalgar. George Washington4 had long recognized that his own operations would be immensely enhanced if the French could achieve naval dominance on the American coast and use it in his favor. The operations of the first French squadron in 1778 had been unsuccessful and disappointing to Washington . Now, in conjunction with the French, the American commander had brought a superior army to Virginia and had persuaded the French to bring a superior naval force to the Chesapeake, though this destination was not the first choice of Washington, who favored an attack on New York. The stakes were high, for the French and Americans aimed at a decisive defeat of the British forces at Yorktown and an end to British operations in Virginia . It is doubtful if Rear Admiral Graves realized the desperate situation, partly of its own making, in which the British army now was. Samuel Hood did not have that knowledge either, but he had the capacity to do what Wellington called “seeing the other side of the hill.” He did not know the Sir Samuel Hood and the Battle of the Chesapeake 2 strength of the French detachment from the West Indies, but he did know that the British had to find, engage, and defeat it to maintain their superiority on the American coast. He realized that time was important and had hastened Graves out of New York to join his own squadron. The strategy of detachment, which the British used for their army in America, required naval superiority if these detachments were not to be defeated and forced to surrender or evacuate their positions. So far this requirement had been maintained. Graves was the senior of the three rear admirals and had the command of the fleet. He faced a difficult task in fighting an enemy fleet of unknown strength when his own fleet comprised two squadrons drawn from different command areas and used to different signaling and tactical systems. Graves has since borne the weight of the subsequent failure of the British attack and the surrender at Yorktown. This interpretation was first propagated by Hood in his letters home after the battle and then later supported by historians , but I believe it to be faulty and not in accordance with the historical facts. If Hood had been in command, it is said, things would have been different . If Hood had been in command! It is a point worth debating that, if Hood had joined the navy at the age of thirteen or fourteen, as was common, then he would have been senior to Graves; and America, or at least the British army at Yorktown, would have been saved! It can certainly be postulated that, if Hood had joined the navy in 1737 or 1738, he would, with the patronage he enjoyed, have reached the rank of master and commander (that is, the command of a ship rated lower than a frigate) before the War of the Austrian Succession ended in 1748, rather than having to wait until 1754. Promotion to post captain would have followed in a few years, with his flag coming before the outbreak of the American War. If he had been in command at the action, would the result have been different? No one would claim that Hood...