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5 The Other Side of the Channel For the government of France, this was a time of preparing for conflict. The king, Louis XVI, had succeeded to the throne in 1774 at the age of nineteen. The diplomatic situation between Britain and France was delicate. While French representatives in Britain stressed their country’s desire for untroubled relations, many French ministers felt that Britain’s power was too great following her successes in the Seven Years’ War and should be downgraded. The American War afforded a chance to do this, and it was understood in these circles that support for the Americans short of war would sooner or later lead to all-out war. Ever since the Peace of Paris in 1763 the King and the governing elite had felt strongly that the humiliation inflicted on France had to be avenged. This feeling can be compared to that in Germany following the Treaty of Versailles . Under the government of Louis XV, intensive planning went on for the time when revenge could be taken. As conceived by the duc de Choiseul and the comte de Broglie,1 a key element of this revenge was an invasion of Britain. The planners, mainly de Broglie and his agents, put together what is still regarded as the most detailed and competent invasion plan the French government ever produced. In its final version it entailed six separate operations to distract the British defenses, and the participation of Spain. The French were to mount attacks on Scotland, Minorca, and British possessions in the Indian Ocean. The Spanish were to attack Gibraltar, Jamaica, and Ireland. When British defenses had been sufficiently weakened by detachments to meet these threats, an army of 60,000 men was to be landed at four points along the coasts of Kent and Sussex and combine to march on London.2 This is not the plan, however, that would have come into operation if the Falkland Islands dispute had ended in hostilities. By that time the French realized that a major naval battle in the Channel was an essential preliminary to any invasion. Naval superiority would be achieved by a force of fifty French and Spanish ships of the line massed in the Channel prepared to fight and defeat the British fleet. But when it came to the point, Choiseul 61 The Other Side of the Channel was unable to persuade the king and his colleagues to back the Spanish, and after the dispute was ended by negotiation, Choiseul resigned. Partly this outcome was dictated by the weak state of French finances. War with Britain and a successful invasion would require a strong fleet— stronger than France in the 1760s could afford to build. In 1767 a British intelligence source said that the French needed to avoid war for at least ten years. Quite by chance this timescale brings us to the French intervention on behalf of the Americans. The main ministers about the King held varying views. At this time the comte de Maurepas3 was one of the most influential. De Maurepas had no official post but was adviser to the King, a similar position to that held by the Prime Minister in Britain. He had been French navy minister until dismissed in 1749. The finance minister, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot,4 who had also once held the post of navy minister, was well aware of the difficulties of the French financial position. Turgot was undoubtedly a man of genius and vision but was accused of arrogance. His enemies undermined his position with the king, and despite his best efforts he was unable to stop France entering into the war. The most important minister of all was the comte de Vergennes,5 the foreign minister. An accomplished diplomat, urbane and charming, he was dedicated to the “balance of power” in Europe. He had been a strong opponent of Choiseul and his virulent anti-British policy. Vergennes was not anti-British—in fact, he favored a rapprochement—but he concurred that the Peace of Paris of 1763 had left Britain too powerful. He wished not to destroy Britain but to reduce British power. Like many of his contemporaries, both French and British, he saw British control of America as the main ingredient in maintaining British power and prosperity. The loss of America would serve to reduce this power, and in the postwar period France would have a chance to increase her share of the American market and thereby increase her wealth while Britain...

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