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6 Questioning Power, Mobilization, and Strategies of the Islamist Opposition How Strong Is the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan? Janine A. Clark In the Jordanian national elections in November 2007, the Islamists suffered a shocking loss of seats. Fielding twenty-two candidates, the party of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)—the Islamic Action Front (IAF)—won only six seats, significantly fewer than the seventeen it had won in 2003.1 While the IAF largely points to the corrupt nature of the elections as an explanation for its losses, some analysts believe that weaknesses and divisions within the MB/ IAF were one of the sources of the problem. Political analysts furthermore argue, as does the government, that Islamist popularity is on the decline. This opinion appears to be confirmed by polling results. While the rise of Islamism in the region generally is unquestioned, the election results and the ensuing debate warrant another look at the presumed strength and popularity of the MB/IAF in Jordan. This chapter critically examines the strength of Islamist opposition movements in terms of their social mobilization capacities. While the MB/IAF’s size and popularity cannot be determined with any certainty due to the lack of free and fair elections, among other factors, there are numerous indicators that the election results may indeed be reflective of a deeper loss of support for the MB/ IAF. After providing the historical background of the MB/IAF and the abovementioned polling results, this chapter examines Islamist victories in previous national elections and in those of the professional associations (PAs). If the MB/IAF is indeed declining, why did it win in past elections? This section argues that their apparent ability to mobilize large numbers of supporters may be more a reflection of regime policy and the population’s lack of other political options than of the strength of the Islamists per se. State policies have led directly to a weakening of other political options and to public apathy. Within this vacuum, Islamists have been able to mobilize support through two means: 118 / Janine A. Clark through an electoral strategy in which the IAF only runs in a limited number of specific, targeted districts, and through patronage. The second section of the chapter examines why the MB/IAF may have declined in popularity, pointing to three factors. The first is the regime’s intensified efforts to curb the reach of the MB/IAF. The second concerns the actions of the Islamists themselves. Jordan’s Islamists consistently have failed to provide concrete policy proposals to address the needs of the population. Finally, in terms of the 2007 elections, the MB/IAF conducted a weak electoral campaign during which its internal divisions surfaced for all to see. While there is no denying the gerrymandering and corruption of the elections, the elections revealed a divided MB and a growing distance between the MB and its base. Islamist Electoral Successes in the Past There can be no doubt that in terms of electoral results, the MB/IAF has been extremely successful. The IAF consistently has won the largest number of seats of any political party in parliament since it began participating in elections in 1993. In the 1989 elections, prior to the legalization of political parties, MBaffiliated candidates won 22 out of 80 seats. Combined with the independent Islamists’ seats, they controlled 40 percent of the lower house of parliament. In 1993, King Husayn (1953–1999) issued a new political parties law that analysts argue was intended to curb Islamists’ parliamentary strength. The new electoral law (still in effect today) instituted a one-person-one-vote formula that forces voters to choose between tribally based candidates and ideological ones, as opposed to voting for as many names as there are seats in the district. Combined with electoral districts that are gerrymandered to privilege rural areas where tribes loyal to the king reside and to discriminate against urban areas where political parties, including the IAF, are concentrated, the electoral law successfully limits the chances of political party candidates to reach parliament . Despite the new law, the newly created IAF (1992) managed to win 16 out of 80 seats in the 1993 national elections, the largest number of seats and votes (15.5 percent) of any political party (Lust-Okar 2001). When combined with the independents’ seats, the Islamist bloc dominated 22 seats. In 1997, the MB/IAF boycotted the parliamentary elections, largely in protest over the new electoral law. Parliament was suspended in 2001, and elections were...

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