James Buchanan and the Coming of the Civil War

2. Prelude to Armageddon: James Buchanan, Brigham Young, and a President’s Initiation to Bloodshed

2 Prelude to Armageddon James Buchanan, Brigham Young, and a President’s Initiation to Bloodshed William P. mackinnon Some of us would yet see “the red stuff run.” Mormon Bishop and Militia Brigadier General Aaron Johnson, March 1857, in Salt Lake City Valley Tan, April 19, 1859 As James Buchanan became president on March 4, 1857, his major priorities were a mixture of the crucial and the prosaic: preserving the Union, curbing civil disorders in Kansas,advancing an expansionist foreign policy, completing his cabinet appointments, dispensing the federal patronage, and recovering from the gastrointestinal ravages of the “National Hotel disease” that had killed his secretary-nephew. Within two weeks a wholly different issue had unexpectedly catapulted to the top of Buchanan’s agenda and had assumed crisis proportions: “the Mormon problem,” or what to do about Brigham Young and the gigantic U.S. territory that he had governed controversially since 1847. That Utah was not a front-rank national issue in early March is reflected in the fact that Buchanan’s inaugural address made no mention of the territory, its governor, Mormonism, or polygamy. For that matter, the valedictory letter that outgoing president Franklin Pierce had privately read to his cabinet earlier that day to reprise their challenges and accomplishments was also silent on these subjects.1 By the end of March 1857 the new administration had made but not announced two fateful decisions about Utah: to supersedeYoung as governor and to provide his as-yet-undesignated successor with a substantial but Figure 2.1. A New Map of the State of California, the Territories of Oregon, Washington, Utah, and New Mexico (Philadelphia: Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co., 1853). Carved from the Mexican Session in 1850, Utah was originally seven hundred miles wide and stretched from the crest of the Rocky Mountains to California. Partly as punishment for the Utah War, Congress reduced it six times during the 1860s to create or enlarge Nevada, Colorado, Wyoming, and Nebraska. 48 · William P. MacKinnon undefined military escort to restore federal authority. Within months the Utah crisis escalated into an armed confrontation that became the country ’s most extensive and expensive military undertaking during the period between the Mexican and CivilWars—one that ultimately pitted the Utah territorial militia (Nauvoo Legion) against almost one-third of the U.S. Army. Exploration of how this crisis developed and exploded into the Utah War of 1857–58 is undergoing a renaissance—one stimulated by the recent sesquicentennial commemoration of the conflict, the publication of long-simmering scholarly work by a phalanx of highly motivated historians , and a sea change in public access to the Mormon Church’s indispensable archives (more extensive than even during the temporary openness stimulated by church historian Leonard J. Arrington in the 1970s).2 Still neglected, though, is an assessment of how James Buchanan handled this unexpected intrusion into the opening months of his presidency and that subject’s crucial linkage to the subject that has dogged his legacy since 1861: Buchanan’s performance in the later part of his administration, especially in dealing with Southern secession. The purpose of this essay is to probe the effectiveness of Buchanan’s Utah War performance. It does so as a reconnaissance intended to stimulate a more complete assessment yet to come. Because of the extent to which Buchanan’s presidential reputation has suffered from the twin scourges of vilification and neglect, this essay focuses on those aspects of Buchanan’s handling of the Mormon problem that went positively, as well as on the even longer list of those crucial Utah issues before which his presidential skills-in-formation faltered. Among the latter are such major matters as the quality of his key Utah War appointments, intelligence gathering, effectiveness in using senior military advisers, communications style, ability to manage the war’s financing in the face of a deep economic recession, and constancy of purpose. Background: The Mormon Problem Develops Because the Utah War is still understood so unevenly, at least minimal background on the conflict’s origins is essential to assessing how well Buchanan handled this earliest aspect of his administration.3 Prelude to Armageddon · 49 The Utah War was the armed confrontation over power and authority between the civil-religious leadership of Utah Territory led by Governor Brigham Young and James Buchanan’s administration. The war did not well up spontaneously because of a single critical incident. Instead, it was a confrontation nearly...