The Generalship of Muhammad: Battles and Campaigns of the Prophet of Allah

6. The Surge

168 The Surge After the destruction of the Banu Qurayzah in January 627, Muhammad allowed his fighters to take a well-deserved break. It would seem that during this interlude he increased his horse-mounted force sixfold, organizing a cavalry force equal in size, if not yet in quality, to that of the Quraysh. This may have been the first installment of support offered from the Sasanids. His focus was now to consolidate his hold on the surrounding tribes to prepare for the grand invasion of Makkah. No longer do the sources regularly speak of Muhammad receiving rumors of pending attacks against the Muslims in Madinah, for it is apparent that Muhammad now realized he was strong enough to dispense with any pretenses and to directly strike any potential rivals. Moreover, for the first time he would engage in punitive operations against those tribes that would defeat any of the operations he dispatched. Despite, or perhaps because of, the extensive success he enjoyed during this period, Muhammad seemingly overestimated the impact of the outside support he began to receive. Within one year he would make the second major mistake of his military career, an error in judgment that would have led to disaster had the Quraysh been more determined to triumph. Instead, the Prophet’s forces would live to fight another day, and subsequent operations, coupled with the valuable experiences and allies gained, would culminate in the collapse of the Qurayshi state and Makkah’s fall.  6 6 The Surge · 169 By April 627, Muhammad sent out the first expedition of that year led by Muhammad bin Maslamah, the Muslims having been now based at Madinah for just less than five years. This operation was possibly far more important than many historical analysts have noted, for it may have been the time when the Muslims captured a high-ranking individual from the important Banu Hanifah, which was to the east of Madinah . The Hanifa served as guardians of Persian caravans in that region and supplied a large quantity of grain to Makkah.1 One of their key leaders , Thumamah bin al-Uthal, was transiting the region while engaged in a pilgrimage to Makkah and was swept up by a Muslim raid with a group of prisoners from the Banu Bakr.2 His capture was a significant prize, for Thumamah had rejected Muhammad’s earlier offer to become a Muslim and had even planned to send an assassin to have the Prophet killed. This made him a high-value target for the Muslims.3 However, his captors did not know who he was until Muhammad made a positive identification of their prisoner when he was brought to Madinah. Thumamah was tied securely to a pillar in the mosque, left exposed to the elements because the mosque had no roof for the main court. He was left there without food and water for at least three days, with the Prophet coming to him each day to ask him what he should do with him.4 Thumamah gave a very political answer, stating that should the Prophet release him he would receive the thanks of a grateful man. On the third day the Prophet released him from his bonds, though not from captivity. Thumamah immediately converted to Islam and completed his pilgrimage to Makkah, declaring to the stunned Quraysh that he would now enforce a grain embargo against them.5 This embargo would have started in the early summer of 627, though its more serious effects would take some time to settle in. Through what was initially a minor raid, Muhammad had secured a tremendous political triumph. By May the Prophet was prepared to engage in a surge of operations , all aimed at neighboring tribes to pressure them to join his side. This strategy presents an interesting conundrum to modern counterinsurgency doctrine. Such doctrine typically claims that excessive force tends to push the local populace away from the counterinsurgent.6 In contrast, insurgencies use tremendous force, even terror, to compel the same populace to join their cause. Yet the people do not largely join the counterinsurgency but instead “inexplicably” join the insurgency. The reason this remains a mystery to the modern counterinsurgent is because most simply do not understand human nature. In general, people Table 6.1. Operations from the Siege of al-Khandaq to the Treaty of al-Hudaybiyah Date Mission Enemy Muslims Leader Result Apr 627 Al-Qurada; Muharib...