Ancient Maya Pottery: Classification, Analysis, and Interpretation

13. Problems and Prospects in Maya Ceramic Classification, Analysis, and Interpretation

13 Problems and Prospects in Maya Ceramic Classification, Analysis, and Interpretation James John Aimers In various ways, the chapters in this book examine the use of pottery in interpretations of the lives of ancient Maya people. In the spirit of the symposia from which most of them are derived, each chapter addresses issues of general method and theory related to type-variety and modal classification with specific examples derived from fieldwork. In this conclusion, I reflect upon some of the concerns that have been raised about type: variety-mode classification in this volume and elsewhere, and I consider some of the ways these may be addressed. Criticisms of type: variety-mode are described below: • The hierarchical structure of type-variety downplays variability in both the appearance of artifacts and the rate of change (see Hammond 1972). This is an old criticism levelled at all typological approaches, but it misses the point of classification, which is to “organize chaos” in relation to a particular problem (see the final quotation from Richard Adams in Ball and Taschek’s chapter). Inevitably, some variability is lost in any classification (see also Rice, this volume). • A similar complaint is that type-variety data cannot be reused for new analyses (Smith 1979). Again, this old notion relies on the mistaken idea that a single classification can be good for all purposes (see discussions in Brew 1946; Dunnell 1971a, 1971b). For a concise response to this idea, see Ball (1979b). • The question of whether type-variety classification deals with culturally meaningful units has been raised by Pendergast (1979) and many others (for example, Chase and Chase, this volume). The historical context of this issue is discussed by Rice in this volume and I return to it below. Regardless of one’s position on the emic reality of type-variety units, the James John Aimers 230 chapters herein show that the type: variety-mode approach can provide a productive starting point for the construction and investigation of questions about ancient Maya culture that run the gamut from ideology to economics. • Foias (2004: 144) notes that type: variety-mode classification privileges surface treatment and decoration, whereas “morphological and paste characteristics have been devalued” (Foias 2004). This is true for many studies (which is one reason why many reports include what are most accurately called type-variety rather than type: variety-mode classifications ). A neglect of shape data has been noted frequently and is relatively easy to address either within type-variety descriptions or separately (for example, Sabloff 1975; Smith 1955). More problematic has been a lack of consistency in dealing with paste variation and a lack of clarity about reasons for highlighting it or downplaying it, another issue I return to below. The neglect of morphological and paste characteristics is not an inherent limitation of the type-variety system (as the contribution here by Urban and colleagues shows) but is an aspect of how the system has been used by some analysts. • Lincoln (1985) and others have noted that some pottery styles continue from one period to another but some analysts give identical pottery in consecutive phases new names (see comments in Forsyth 1983: 5; Adams 1971: 30). This is one of the issues that seems to depend on the predispositions of the analyst, just as lumping and splitting do, and clearer methodological statements may help (see comments below). Bill’s chapter makes suggestions about these sorts of issues (for example, her “macro-traditions”). • In the first part of the twentieth century, there was an implicit (Kidder 1915, 1917) or explicit use of concepts derived from evolutionary biology in pottery classification. For example, Colton suggested that pottery types in a ware had “a genetic relation to each other” (Colton and Hargrave 1937: 11). Brew’s (1946: 53) response to this was dismissive: “Phylogenetic relationships (i.e., relationships of descent) do not exist between inanimate objects.” Nevertheless, the evolutionary analogy has continued to be important (for example, in the work of Neff and Shennan and in Ball’s use of ceramic “homologies” and “analogies”) and to some degree controversial. Concerns about the use of evolutionary analogies are reminiscent of recent debates about approaches to objects that suggest that they have life histories and forms of agency (see, for example, Aimers 2010, 2012; Arnold 2007: 110; Gell 1998; Kopytoff 1988). This issue is beyond the scope of this volume (but for a useful discussion see O’Brien and Lyman 2003). [3.137.218.215] Project MUSE (2024-04-19 02:10...