Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War

1. The Historical Path of Brazilian Foreign Policy

1 The Historical Path of Brazilian Foreign Policy The notion of an integrated South American political and economic space that formed the core of the leadership project advanced by Itamaraty during the Cardoso era was not a sudden invention. Indeed, an abiding characteristic of Brazilian foreign-policy makers is their slow rate of change and careful consideration before action. Historical context is thus critical for understanding the evolution and nature of policies pursued by Itamaraty during the period in question. As this chapter will describe, the historical trajectory of Brazil’s foreign policy both reached a point of crisis and provided recourse to a possible resolution when the Cold War ended in 1989 and the advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) raised the possibility of a realignment of hemispheric relations that might marginalize Brazil (Abdenur 1994a; Almeida 1993; Amorim 1991a; Barbosa 1994; Lafer 1990; Lafer and Fonseca 1994). The outcome of much discussion within Itamaraty was a return to suggestions of South American regionalism, which had previously been advanced with little success, especially by Rio Branco and Juscelino Kubitschek. The primary task of this chapter, then, is to trace the development of Brazilian foreign policy in the Americas from Rio Branco’s tenure as foreign minister to the beginning of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso presidency. In broad terms this narrative may be divided into three main phases: close approximation to the United States; a “quest for autonomy”; and finally the articulation of a regionally based, cooperatively independent foreign policy. Attention will first be turned to Rio Branco and his elaboration of a foreign policy of approximation to the United States. An outline of the gradual decline in effectiveness of the Baron’s precepts leads to the next section, which begins with the presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek and proceeds to discuss the rise of a foreign policy of autonomy in the 1960s and 1970s. The 1980s brings a change in focus to Brazilian foreign policy and a marked improvement in Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War 18 international relations in the Southern Cone. Here the discussion will center on measures to improve regional cooperation in the economic and security dimensions , programs which eventually assumed a reactive character in response to changes in the hemispheric and global political economy. Ultimately, the reactive turn to regionalism resulted in the creation of Mercosul and efforts to expand the bloc to encompass the bulk of South America and cement the major change in Brazilian foreign-policy thinking in the 1980s: the turn to continental leadership and use of the region as the context for advancing and achieving national development. A Policy of Approximation The roots of contemporary Brazilian foreign policy can be traced to the beginning of the twentieth century and Rio Branco’s decade-long tenure as foreign minister. It was during this period that Itamaraty began to assume a reputation for professionalism, preparation, and apoliticism—at least with respect to domesticpoliticaldebates (Vieira2001).Itwasalsoduringthisperiodthataseries of fundamental precepts for the conceptualization of Brazilian foreign policy were first elaborated (Almeida 1993, 93). At the heart of this emerging policy program was a desire for Brazil to be a leader among states and a shaper of the emerging world order. This ambition was reflected during the Baron’s lifetime in the pride Brazilians took in the 1906 Rio de Janeiro Pan American Summit (J. Smith 1991, 53–57), participation in the 1907 Hague Conference, and later inclusion in the Versailles Treaty negotiations and on the Executive Council of the League of Nations (J. Smith 1991, 126–133; Bueno 2002a, 222–233). Yet there remained the persistent problem of Brazil’s actual power not matching its perceived potential, leaving the country vulnerable to a coordinated attack by its Spanish-speaking neighbors or marauding European powers . The solution pursued by Rio Branco was two-pronged. On the continental level he successfully settled Brazil’s remaining undefined borders through a process of negotiation and arbitration (Ricupero 2000), taking great care to ensure that he did not create ill-will or leave his country open to the charge of imperial expansionism (Burns 1966, 38–48). Residual concerns that the demarcation of the national territory would be but the first step in a drawn-out process of conquest were subsumed by the second prong of the Baron’s strategy : close alliance with the United States to improve Brazil’s position in the region and to protect against foreign incursion (J. Smith 1991, 62–67). Perhaps a greater threat...