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5 The Security Dimension In his discussion of the rise of a nascent Mercosul security community Andrew Hurrell (1998a, 252) notes that questions of politics, economics, and security are intertwined, with advances in one sustaining and furthering progress in the others. Within this mix regionalism takes on a stabilizing role, working to build the shared ideas and interests that help establish the mutual confidence needed to encourage cooperation and remove armed conflict from the language of diplomacy. To a certain extent this argument mirrors the pyramidal model of hegemony I employ, suggesting that for one of the aspects to retain strength and resiliency it must be supported by the others. The subject of this chapter is thus how Itamaraty has sought to encourage and lead the growth of internally sustainable security structures in South America in order to create the conditions necessary for the cohesive regional integration that it desires for Brazil’s wider international strategy. Significantly, Itamaraty’s ability to lead the continent in its regional projects is to a certain extent conditioned by Brazil’s capacity to ensure a reasonable level of security for its partner states. Here an immediate problem arises, namely, an inability to seriously project force to defend the continent from external incursion. The solution to this conundrum can be found in a loose application of the concentric circles of Golbery do Couto e Silva’s (1967) geopolitical strategy. In the largest circles, encompassing the global level and the Western Hemisphere, Rio Branco’s policy of friendship with the United States is deployed to prevent external threats (Cervo 2002, 15). However, the situation shifts when we move to the South America circle. While the policy is certainly not one of antagonism toward the United States, a clear emphasis is placed on excluding extra–South American actors from internal South American affairs. The analysis presented in this chapter is thus one of how Brazilian foreign policy has sought to foster a continental security environment that remains friendly with, but independent from, the United States. Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War 126 Only the most optimistic of observers would classify the Brazilian leadership strategy in the security dimension an unqualified success. In traditional security areas such as the prevention of war and the preservation of national sovereignty Brazilian security policy during the Cardoso era proved reasonably successful, particularly as a brake on external intervention in South American democratic practices. Yet it would be pushing the point to credit success solely to the influence and prestige of Brazil; in many instances U.S. opinion and action were an important factor. Nowhere is this more evident than in the new transnational security issues of narco-trafficking, terrorism, and insurgency. As will be argued in this chapter, Brazilian success in the security dimension has been constrained by a lack of national and regional capacities as well as the policy restrictions created by the country’s sustained and strict respect for national sovereignty. Indeed, if we set the problem in terms of Golbery’s geopolitical circles, the argument is that failure in the security dimension was caused by an unwillingness to meld individual country-bubbles into the South American circle. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first explains the importance of democracy and development in Brazil’s national defense policy and sets up the conceptual framework for three empirical cases. The protection of democracy forms the first case set out in the second section, with an examination of disruptions in Paraguay, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela being used to illustrate how Itamaraty deployed regional instruments such as Mercosul and the Rio Group to combat authoritarian retrogressions and build an ethic of security cooperation within the continent. More direct reference to suggestions of interdependence and regionalism forms the basis of the third section, where the use of physical integration as a technique for peace building is explored in the ending of the Ecuador-Peru border conflict and the elaboration of IIRSA. Finally , attention is turned to the weakest aspect of Itamaraty’s security strategy, the new security issues of narco-trafficking, terrorism, and insurgency. Here the shortcoming that emerges lies not in the willingness to cooperate, but in differing national capacities and the limitations that a strict respect for sovereignty places on policies designed to address nontraditional threats. National Defense and Democracy As a Mercosul-based security community evolved in the mid-1990s (Hurrell 1998a),theCardosoadministrationembarkedonareevaluationofthedoctrine governing military planning. The resulting 1996 Política de Defesa Nacional [18.223.106...

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