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Afterword
- University Press of Florida
- Chapter
- Additional Information
Afterword Although this study formally ends with Admiral Taylor’s departure from the Far East, it is perhaps not inappropriate to comment briefly on the position of American armed forces in China after Japan had become a major disturber of the peace there. The Navy’s floating forces continued as before to provide protection for Americans on the China coast and rivers, which remained troubled by warlord rivalries, Communists, bandits, and, after 1937, the Japanese. The role of the land forces, the Marines and Army, was subject to lengthy consideration and reconsideration through the years. This was sparked by a letter from the War Department to the State Department in November 1935 in which the former recommended, as it had in 1931, that the Fifteenth Infantry be withdrawn from Tientsin. Acting Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring argued that the original purpose for maintaining the small force in North China had long since passed and that under changing conditions it could serve no useful purpose. Anticipating that the Japanese would soon establish a “semi-autonomous government” in North China under their control and that the Fifteenth Infantry’s continued presence in Tientsin would threaten “gravest complications” likely to involve the United States in war with Japan, Woodring wanted to withdraw the troops and avoid such danger.1 Three months later, Secretary of State Hull responded with a firm rejection of the Army’s position. Hull asserted that the Fifteenth Infantry in North China, along with the forces of other powers, had a stabilizing and reassuring influence. Moreover, the Army was not in North China for combat but as a guard and potential escort. Hull thought the threat of incidents between Americans and Japanese was “not great,” a situation unlikely to change, and that withdrawal of the troops would not be in the best interest of the United States. It would contribute to a further breakdown of the cooperative policy among the powers in China, long promoted by the United States and exemplified by the Boxer Protocol of 1901 and the Washington Conference agreements of 1922. It would suggest withdrawal of the United States from its commitments with other powers to maintain peace in Tientsin. It would provoke unfavorable reaction among the Chinese, as it would follow quickly on the adverse Chinese response to an American silver purchase policy and the recent failure of American firms in China, such as the collapse of the American Oriental Bank at Shanghai. It might also be misinterpreted by the Japanese and encourage them to hasten “their militaristic advance” into China. The State Department was prepared to reconsider the question should other powers indicate their intention to withdraw their forces, but for the time being, keeping the Army units in Tientsin served a “very useful purpose.”2 In a subsequent paper, Maxwell Hamilton of the State Department’s Far Eastern Affairs Division employed similar views to oppose withdrawal of the Marines of the American Legation Guard as well as the Fifteenth Infantry. Hamilton claimed that his paper 344 / Afterword summarized the policy of the State Department , the Army, and the Navy toward North China.3 The State Department’s position was bolstered by a report from Major General Charles E. Kilbourne, the commanding general in the Philippines, after a visit to North China. Once an advocate of withdrawal, Kilbourne now held that the troops should remain in North China and that the Legation Guard was an “absolute necessity.” The State Department’s policy as conveyed to Minister Johnson in Peking was to preserve the status quo.4 In the summer of 1936, representatives of the State and War departments seemed to talk past each other when they presented their departments’ positions on the Fifteenth Infantry at Tientsin. Brigadier General Stanley D. Embick of the War Department’s War Plans Division complained that the Army’s force served “no useful military purpose” and that there was no circumstance under which the regiment could fight against either the Chinese or the Japanese. If Americans were involved in combat they would have to surrender , since they could not be rescued. The men from the State Department responded that the Fifteenth Infantry was not expected to engage in combat. The troops in Tientsin and the Marines in Peking were elements of a single defense effort whose purpose was to protect Americans and their property and to provide armed escort should it be necessary to evacuate Americans and others to the sea. Nelson Johnson had recently been accorded the higher...