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19 The Shanghai Incident After Hostilities The sudden cessation of serious fighting in early March 1932 by no means ended the Shanghai Incident. Another two months of sparring between the Chinese and Japanese would occur before even a formal cease-fire agreement could be signed. Much longer would be devoted to political questions that were never really resolved. Of immediate concern at the Navy Department was how soon the Thirty-first Infantry Regiment could be returned to the Philippines and when the six destroyers and six submarines of the Asiatic Fleet could go through with their previously planned return to the United States. After the resumption of heavy fighting on 20 February, the Chief of Naval Operations had authorized Admiral Taylor to keep the destroyers and submarines on the Asiatic Station for the duration of the emergency.1 Hardly had the Japanese announced their cease-fire than Admiral Pratt radioed Taylor: “When you are satisfied that situation at Shanghai will permit a reduction of forces including land forces please inform the department.”2 Taylor proposed six days later that, as conditions were improving and the Shanghai Volunteers had demobilized, the Thirty-first Infantry depart for Manila on 18 March. He reported that Minister Johnson agreed. The Defense Committee of senior officers ashore, however, objected on the grounds that the Chinese still might attack. Taylor intended to retain the Marines at their current reinforced level, seventeen hundred men. The admiral most emphatically urged that no American forces be committed to guarantee a neutral zone beyond the settlement boundaries. The area was crossed by canals, and the few roads available for motors were difficult of passage, especially during rain. The Japanese were still plagued by snipers, and neutral forces attempting to provide security would be subject to constant criticism for occurrences they could not prevent.3 Taylor’s message was generally confirmed by Consul General Cunningham. Colonel Gasser and a representative of the commanding general in the Philippines had informed Cunningham that the Thirty-first Infantry was badly needed in Manila. Having been assured by Taylor and Johnson that the Army could be safely withdrawn, as the emergency had passed, and believing that there was no serious threat of disturbances from within or from outside the settlement, Cunningham concurred in the proposed withdrawal.4 The messages from Taylor and Cunningham met with total disapproval at the State Department. From the Far Eastern Affairs Division, Stanley Hornbeck observed that the Thirty-first Infantry had been dispatched in response to “diplomatic need” as well as “military need.” He did not pass judgment on the military need, but he opposed withdrawing the regiment until there had been a settlement at Shanghai and consultations with the French, the Italians, and especially the British. The dispatch of troops to Shanghai had been decided only after full exchanges with the British, during which the Americans sought to send a force as nearly as possible equal to that of the British with the thought that this would put the United States in a better position to ask Britain for diplomatic support. 294 / Part III. The U.S. Navy and the Confrontation between China and Japan Hornbeck was also affronted that Admiral Taylor had made his recommendation independently . In Hornbeck’s view, the recommendation should “properly” have been sent through Johnson to the State Department, which would then take the matter up with the War and Navy departments. Hornbeck advised that the War and Navy departments be asked to instruct their commanders that the administration did not deem it advisable to withdraw the Thirty-first Infantry at that time and that, as the question involved international relations, any further recommendation on the matter should be channeled through the American minister.5 Although he had not himself volunteered his approval of the withdrawal, Nelson Johnson was recipient of a very clear instruction that indicated total disapproval of Taylor’s action and that any further proposals on withdrawals should go through him, the American minister. Secretary Stimson reminded Johnson that the Thirty-first Infantry had been dispatched to China in cooperation with other powers that faced common defense problems and supported certain common diplomatic objectives. After consulting with the War and Navy departments, it was agreed that the time had not come for a withdrawal and that no steps along this line should be taken before consulting with the interested powers. Stimson, therefore, directed that any recommendations by American authorities relating to withdrawals should be confidentially communicated through the American minister and...

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