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7 Explosions on the Yangtze, 1926 The movement of the Nationalist (Kuomin­ tang) armies from South China into the middle Yangtze area during the late summer and fall of 1926 was attended by crises that extended from Hankow upriver to beyond Chungking. In the upper river, a shipping crisis was brought on by an acute shortage of native water transport available to move the troops and supplies of rival warlords, especially those of General Yang Sen, whose headquarters were at Wanhsien. Yang Sen was a general of considerable ability and charm whom foreigners on occasion regarded as a likely candidate to bring order to the upper Yangtze. But as Commander Schaffer in Monocacy reported from Chung­ king: “It is probable that there never has been anyone in control who has made himself so obnoxious to foreign shipping as has General Yang Sen. The Chinese generals before 1926 had depended in large part on native junks for transport, but the expansion of shipping under foreign flags had driven much of the junk traffic from the Upper River.” And as Schaffer reported: “Nearly all the military authorities on the River are fast coming to consider it right to transport their troops on foreign vessels.” It will be recalled that foreign naval men and diplomats, especially the British and the Americans, had sought to protect their shipping from Chinese interference by denying transport to Chinese troops and military supplies, thus, ostensibly at least, preserving their neutrality among the warring Chinese factions. The demands by Yang Sen and other warlords were a challenge to the asserted American and British positions on neutrality . The Standard Oil steamers, which did not carry passengers or general cargo, generally avoided interference from the Chinese. The Yangtze Rapid Steamship Company in 1926 had become the sole American firm engaged in passenger and general cargo shipping on the upper Yangtze, and it had proved reluctant , as had C. R. Cox earlier, to follow the strictures of American neutrality. Schaffer warned in late August that Yang Sen might at any time “unlawfully interfere” with American steamers and other foreign shipping.1 Schaffer’s consular colleague at Chungking, Walter A. Adams, warned that the transport of troops on foreign vessels had “largely passed out of control.” Adams was convinced that the “ultimate fate of foreign shipping on the Upper Yangtze” depended on the ability of foreign shippers to avoid transporting Chinese troops during either peace or war. This could be achieved only by “repeated and persistent use of naval force” by the American , British, Japanese, and French naval authorities. He cautioned that independent action by the United States would only lead to “disaster.” Moreover, he doubted whether it was legal for his consulate to deny Chinese troops transportation on American passenger ships when there was not actual fighting. As a first step toward developing a comprehensive plan for international action, Adams recommended that the leading treaty powers act to deny Chinese-owned ships the protection of foreign treaty-power flags.2 The American chargé at Peking, Ferdinand Mayer, denied that only continued and persistent use of 102 / Part II. The U.S. Navy and the Rise of the Nationalists naval force would prevent the Chinese from using foreign ships for the transport of their troops, nor did he consider that independent employment of force by the United States would necessarily lead to disaster. And he directed Adams to continue the policy of denying Chinese troops transport on American ships unless otherwise directed by the State Department.3 The confrontation over the transport of Chinese troops feared by both Schaffer and Adams broke at Wanhsien in early September . It involved a clash between Yang Sen and the British over interference by the former with shipping of the prestigious British firm Butterfield and Swire. The crisis was set off when the Butterfield steamer Wanliu arrived on 29 August 1926 at Wanhsien from downriver and signaled to HMS Cockchafer: “Send an armed guard.” It seems that sixteen Chinese soldiers had boarded Wanliu forty miles downriver at the small port of Yun Yang. The officers of Wanliu, however, had managed to retain control of their ship and move on to Wanhsien. According to later Chinese claims, Wanliu swamped one or perhaps more junks as she moved away from Yun Yang, resulting in the drowning of Chinese soldiers and the loss of considerable treasure. Wanliu was able to continue its passage to Chungking after personnel from Cockchafer evicted the sixteen Chinese soldiers. After Wanliu’s departure, the...

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