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11 The Northern Bombing Group The Northern Bombing Group, a unit established to destroy German submarine facilities at Bruges-Ostend-Zeebrugge through aerial assault, became the largest naval aviation initiative of World War I. Initially envisioned as employing roughly 6,000 men, it would have utilized hundreds of frontline aircraft, several airfields positioned across a wide swath of Flanders, and a huge assembly and repair base in southern England. The NBG represented the supreme embodiment of the Department’s aggressive approach to combating the U-boat menace. To achieve its objective, the Navy would have created six day and six night squadrons to carry out “round the clock” attacks by light and heavy bombers. Ultimately, the Navy established four day and four night squadrons, with naval pilots manning night squadrons and Marine Corps aviators responsible for day operations. Admiral Samuel McGowan, head of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, called the entire project “the largest ever undertaken by the Navy to be consummated in anywhere near so short of time.” Captain David Hanrahan, a veteran destroyer captain and skipper of the Q-ship Santee, directed the group from his headquarters at Autingues, where he operated under the aegis of the British admiral commanding the Dover Patrol. From the start this venture enjoyed support at the highest levels and received priority over other initiatives. Unfortunately, failure to secure sufficient aircraft prevented the unit from ever carrying out its intended mission . The NBG initiative also ignited a nasty confrontation with Army aviators that blighted relations between the air services in Europe and lasted well into the postwar period.1 * * * Bombing the submarine menace out of existence posed a difficult tactical challenge. In the last two years of the war the Flanders U-boat flotilla claimed one-third of all British vessels sunk in home waters. Located close to major shipping lanes, these facilities ranked at the top of Allied strategists’ list as targets for destruction. By 1918 German forces had turned the Bruges- The Northern Bombing Group 315 Ostend-Zeebrugge triangle into a virtual fortress. Coastal artillery emplacements studded the coast, while swarms of land and seaplanes defended the skies. In Bruges, concrete submarine pens offered protection against aerial bombardment. Over 200 antiaircraft guns pointed skyward. Batteries of searchlights powered by gasoline generators pierced the night darkness, 30 at Bruges alone. German defenders received about 30 minutes’ warning before any attack. Britain sought to overcome these defenses by deploying heavily armed monitors, swarms of destroyers, CMBs, and other small craft—and, after 1917, DH-4 day bombers and huge Handley Page aircraft at night, but with little success. Not one of the U-boat shelters was hit until September 1918, and only three submarines were damaged. Competing demands for aerial support frequently diverted RNAS/RAF bombing units from antisubmarine missions. By contrast, American planners argued that attacks, to be effective, must be massive, focused, and continuous, and they anticipated carrying out such raids by themselves if the war lasted into 1919.2 The shift from defensive to offensive tactics reflected many converging factors . Combating the U-boat constituted the Navy’s preeminent responsibility, as it had from the opening days of the war. Hunting submarines by seaplane in open waters, however, had achieved little success. Conditions at Dunkirk remained far from optimal. British airmen, who frequently provided guidance, abandoned seaplane patrol and begun using land bombers to attack Belgian ports. French officers endorsed the British approach. After being rebuffed by the U.S. Army, the Marine Corps aggressively sought a role in the Navy’s aerial assault scheme. Nonetheless, severe obstacles existed to such an ambitious program. The proposed size of the NBG proved daunting. Competing, even conflicting, operational and tactical concepts flowed from Washington and Paris/London. The Navy possessed no cadre of flyers trained for land aircraft and missions, no related instruction program, and did not have the requisite machines. Finally, a land-based bombing offensive raised the toxic issue of “poaching” on Army missions and competing for scarce equipment. This, in turn, merged with the explosive issue of “amalgamation.” The concept of shifting away from antisubmarine patrols, essentially a defensive posture, toward offensive bombing of U-boats and their support facilities took root early in the winter of 1918. Following his work at Felixstowe, Robert Lovett visited English gunnery and bombing schools and then spent several weeks with the RNAS Intelligence Department, all the time watching , listening, and compiling notes. Increasingly, he viewed random patrols as a waste of...

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