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8 On Duty, Off Duty The Work and Life of the Station The two-dozen seaplane patrol and bombing stations established along the coasts of France, Ireland, England, and Italy constituted the iron fist of naval aviation’s antisubmarine campaign. Though differing widely in terms of geography , weather, size, and equipment, they shared many features, including physical layout and operational procedures. Organized much like individual warships of the fleet, stations were typically isolated and self-contained, yet closely linked in a larger scheme designed to protect American convoys and Allied merchant ships and hunt U-boats to extinction. Naval aviation stations resembled discrete factory villages but with a more destructive purpose . These military communities, however, lived two separate lives and exhibited two personalities. When “On Duty,” almost every action focused on antisubmarine missions and the work and duties that made those missions possible. This included the Navy’s highly structured approach to time, work, order, rank, and discipline. Being “Off Duty,” and everyone knew exactly when that was, encompassed the officers’ and bluejackets’ other lives, their leisure time, recreation, athletics, pets, leave, and liberty. One world covered the hangars, launching ramps, armories, shops, and offices. The other included the barracks, mess hall, YMCA hut, makeshift theater, boxing ring, baseball diamond, nearby attractions, and distant metropolises. The two worlds often intersected but never surrendered their essential distinctness. Antisubmarine missions offered the raison d’etre of the naval aviation station and necessitated regular reconnaissance, convoy escort, and antimine patrols, interspersed with specific alerte/allo and rescue operations. All were designed to complement each other and work in coordination with the fleet of surface vessels—destroyers, sub chasers, minesweepers, drifters, and trawlers . For the most part, flying personnel performed their duties in comparative safety. Only at Dunkirk and Porto Corsini did aviators face the risk of combat , although on at least one occasion a surfaced U-boat attacked a dirigible 232 Stalking the U-Boat from NAS Paimboeuf and another bracketed a DD flying boat from Dunkirk with shrapnel. Conversely, all personnel, no matter what station they flew from, faced extreme danger from equipment failure at sea or malfunctioning ordnance. In fact, the aviators’ war often seemed less directed against the Germans and more against fog, waves, low clouds, physical discomfort, and numbing boredom. Contemporary U-boats, though mechanically unsophisticated compared to their successors, nonetheless represented cutting-edge technology in their day and posed a lethal threat to warships and merchant vessels alike. Armed with torpedoes with an effective range of up to 10,000 yards and capable of maximum surfaced speeds of 14–17 knots, large submarines traveled as far as 10,000 miles without refueling. Underwater some dashed at seven to nine knots for very short periods or crept along at two or three knots for several hours. They preferred to maneuver for attack on the surface, however, only submerging for the final run. Early in the conflict it took as long as 2.5 minutes for a large boat to drop beneath the waves, but by 1918 oceangoing versions plunged out of sight in about a minute. Smaller coastal versions could dive in 30 seconds. Safe depths exceeded 150 feet. Manned by a crew of 30 to 50 officers and ratings, their greatest advantages were stealth and invisibility, offset by limited underwater endurance, relative fragility, a need to resurface every day to recharge batteries and ventilate the boat, and a complete inability to attack or navigate once totally submerged. Given these realities, naval aviation’s greatest contribution to the antisubmarine war was not sinking U-boats, as it was almost impossible to locate and attack a surfaced vessel successfully before it slipped underwater. Further, most ordnance carried by aircraft proved incapable of destroying a submarine unless it landed virtually on top of the enemy, though bombs could damage sensitive equipment or cause oil leaks, allowing marauding surface vessels to mount depth charge attacks. Rather, aircraft forced submarines to dive when spotted, effectively blinding them, thus granting warships and cargo vessels safe transit through the area. There was an inverse statistical correlation between submarine activity and aerial surveillance, most noticeably at night when aircraft did not venture out and U-boats ran on the surface, and during rough and foggy weather. German commanders commented frequently on the impact of Allied aviation efforts and the ways they necessarily altered U-boat tactics and operational procedures. Aerial patrols also played a useful role detecting floating mines left by UC-class mine-laying submarines...

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