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Chapter 3 Patterns of Normalization: Islamist Parties in Indonesia julie chernov hwang Indonesia stands apart from the other countries examined in this book as arguably the most democratic. Since the fall of the authoritarian New Order regime in 1998, it has experienced three cycles of free and fair elections. Of the countries in this volume, only Indonesia was ranked by Freedom House as ‘‘Free.’’ In 2010, Freedom House gave Indonesia a combined score for political rights and civil liberties of 2.5, while Malaysia received a 4.0, Turkey 3.0, Pakistan and Morocco 4.5, and Yemen lowest at 5.5.1 Indonesia is the largest Muslim nation in the world, with an estimated population of over 240 million, of whom over 88 percent are Muslim.2 It is home to the two largest Islamic mass organizations in the world, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), with a membership estimated at 50 million, and Muhammadiyah, with approximately 30 million.3 Islamic civil society is active and lively, with myriad Islamic organizations at the national, provincial, and district levels ranging from progressive Islamic organizations, which campaign for the rights of women and minorities, to hardline Islamist organizations that advocate the reestablishment of the Caliphate. Moreover, there are parties at nearly every point in the politico-religious spectrum from parties that are largely secular in orientation to those with roots in Islamic communities to those seeking the implementation of shari’a. Recognizing this variation is important for understanding the unique position of Islamist parties in Indonesia vis-àvis other Muslim nations. Unlike Malaysia or Turkey, there are no institutional or structural constraints on the ability of Islamist parties to contest Patterns of Normalization 59 and win elections. The only constraint on Islamist party success is the preference of the Indonesian voter. Thus, Indonesia represents an interesting contrast to the other cases in this volume. Using the Indonesian case, we can analyze how Islamist parties behave in a democratic political system, where there are multiple Islamically oriented parties contesting free and fair elections; where Islamist parties do not gain significant votes vis-à-vis their fellow Islamist parties by asserting their religious bona fides in electoral campaigns; and where ‘‘protest voting’’ is one reason among many for party success. At the same time, we find Islamist parties in Indonesia possessing several similarities to other cases in this volume. First, Islamist parties have become increasingly normalized and integrated in the political system. This manifests itself in several ways including the common practice of building coalitions at the national, provincial, and district levels with secular and nationalist parties; Islamist party participation in the governing coalitions of the administration of president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2004 and again in 2009; a deemphasis on Islamist themes in their electoral campaigns ; and a reassessment and revision of the plan to struggle for the formal acknowledgement of shari’a in the constitution. Second, as this normalization process is occurring, Islamist parties are becoming less distinct from their political competitors. This is a result of two interrelated factors. First, most Islamist parties are ‘‘moderating’’ their agendas, postponing and reassessing those aspects of their platforms where their goals are not widely shared by the populace and diversifying their basket of issues.4 Second, nationalist parties have also sought to appeal to voters on religious grounds, especially around election time, resulting in a mainstreaming of political Islam. Thus, there is movement toward the ideological center from both directions. This chapter seeks to assess the extent of and patterns of normalization among Islamist parties in the Indonesian political system. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to give a brief overview of the electoral and party systems. The Indonesian party system is a highly fragmented multiparty system with no dominant party. Over the course of the 1999, 2004, and 2009 elections, between 40 and 48 parties competed, between 5 and 11 of them Islamist in orientation. Parties seldom breach the 10 percent threshold. Only two nationalist parties, Partai Golkar (Functional Groups) and the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle; PDI-P), have garnered more than 10 [3.147.42.168] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 17:21 GMT) 60 Julie Chernov Hwang percent of the vote in three consecutive elections.5 When Partai Democrat (Democrat Party; PD), a nationalist party formed in 2004, won 20 percent of the vote in 2009, it was referred to as a ‘‘tsunami.’’ Islamically oriented parties in Indonesia can be divided into two categories : pluralist Islamic...

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