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C h a p t e r 7 Enter the State In April 1992 Compton city councilperson Patricia Moore planned to bus a group of “concerned citizens” to Simi Valley to hear the closing arguments in the trial of four Los Angeles police officers charged with the beating of black motorist Rodney King. Moore told the Compton Bulletin she wanted African Americans to attend so that they could be “the last thing on [jury members] minds.”1 Not surprisingly, having lived in a racially charged area, many Compton residents took the trial personally, believing King’s beating was racially motivated. Moore wanted to ensure the jury members saw that concern. Nevertheless, on April 29 the jury of twelve acquitted the officers. The verdicts stunned many Americans, who for over a year had been bombarded by images from a bystander’s amateur video of the abuse. Police and elected officials urged calm and order, but their pleas could not contain the brewing anger. The rage was most palpable in the southern part of Los Angeles, an area mostly inhabited by poor and working-class blacks and Latinos. Groups of discouraged Angelenos gathered on the streets and in front of the headquarters of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). Soon the crowds turned into protests and the protests turned into violence. Within hours of the verdict, a white man lay on the asphalt in the middle of an intersection in South Central Los Angeles, beaten, kicked, and bashed with a fire extinguisher by irate African Americans. His name, Reginald Denny, became “almost as famous as King’s,” as people across the nation and around the globe watched Los Angeles and its surrounding areas go up in flames.2 The immediate response of local law enforcement officers failed to stop the disturbances. The LAPD reacted slowly: police officials had decided not to mobilize their officers during the trial, and when the verdicts came down that afternoon, most of the force’s one thousand detectives had already gone 188 Chapter 7 home for the day. Within hours the situation turned dire. Shortly after nine that evening, California governor Pete Wilson requested two thousand soldiers from the California Army National Guard. These troops were, however, unprepared to intercede immediately because LAPD administrators had repeatedly assured military officials they would not be needed to quell any disturbances resulting from the verdict. Consequently, National Guard officers had lent a considerable amount of “control equipment” to other agencies.3 These inadequate mobilizations allowed the riots to continue and to spread throughout the Los Angeles area, including Compton. Compton had escaped damage during the 1965 uprisings, but time had changed that. In 1965 Compton was on the edge of being a suburb, but in 199, it was an “urban ghetto.” At the time of the trial, Compton’s 10.1 square miles were home to just over ninety thousand people, approximately 53 percent African American and 44 percent Latino.4 In 1992 just over 25 percent of Compton residents lived below the official poverty line and their frustration with this bare existence manifested in the days after the verdict. Many rioters looted stores, using the opportunity not only to express their anger toward local businesses but also to fill their households with much needed items, including diapers and groceries. Compton’s systemic poverty laid the groundwork for the frustration and desperation exhibited in 1992. The bleak economy also outraged many residents. The verdicts in the King trial brought the enmity accrued over years of police brutality and poverty to a boiling point. As Compton residents started fires and looted stores, municipal officials could do little but look outward for assistance. In response, the members of Compton’s city council placed the town under a state of emergency, enabling them to ask for state and federal aid. Outside help came quickly. Approximately 250 marines swept into Compton to rein in the outbreak of looting and arson.5 With the blessing of local elected officials external forces occupied the town. Compton’s leaders would not always welcome outside intervention. During the same year as the King riots, local officials resisted a state takeover of Compton Unified. Defining it as “academically bankrupt,” state assemblyman Willard Murray led the charge to have the state take control, but the initial attempts failed. In 1993, however, when school district officials requested, and the state granted, a $10.5 million emergency loan to keep the school district running, the state took charge of the beleaguered district...

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