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C h a p t e r 7 Conclusion: Contemporary Tanzania Tanzania has attained its post-reform equilibrium. During five decades of independence , it has morphed from a failed experiment in socialist egalitarianism to a dystopian realm in which economic and political inequalities have taken on every appearance of permanence. The principal political characteristics of contemporary Tanzania are dominance by a political-economic oligarchy embedded within the CCM hierarchy, the propensity of many members of this oligarchy to use corruption as a means of consolidating and maintaining their dominance, and a pattern of economic growth that benefits those at the top of the society. Although not all the members of the Tanzanian oligarchy are among the mafisadi (corrupt ones), many engage in the practice , and the visibility of high profile corruption scandals has tainted the CCM leadership cadre as a whole. The generosity of the donor community strengthens this equilibrium. Tanzania now receives nearly $3 billion annually in foreign direct assistance, almost 13 percent of gross national income (GNI), and is the world’s third largest recipient of nonmilitary development assistance behind only Iraq and Afghanistan.1 China is now joining Western donors in ways that further reinforce the dominance of the CCM oligarchy. The Tanzanian state also derives stability from democratic legitimation: the CCM has managed decisive, though variable, victories in all four of the country’s multiparty elections. Although there have been allegations of electoral irregularities—including doubts about the neutrality of electoral monitors , the CCM’s use of takrima (gifts) to obtain votes, poor management of election ballots, and physical harassment of opposition parties and their supporters—these do not yet add to wholesale electoral theft. It seems incontrovertible that the Tanzanian electoral process is imperfect, damaged by the fact that the CCM leadership has used all these tactics to maintain a winning 200 Chapter 7 share of the vote. Despite these concerns and the obvious need for major improvements in the country’s electoral process, no one has yet suggested that the outcome of these elections would have been significantly different had the election taken place under a more perfect set of election procedures. Nor has any electoral observer organization chosen to describe Tanzania’s election results as other than broadly free and fair.2 Tanzania does not receive an honors grade in democracy, but it does not receive a failing grade either. The majority of Tanzanians including supporters of opposition parties appear to accept that their country’s election results are, overall, an accurate reflection of their political preferences. As a result, Tanzania has not experienced the sort of post-election violence that has taken place in several other African countries. Tanzania stands out from its regional neighbors based on what has not taken place there in the last twenty-five years. It has not experienced genocidal events (Rwanda, Sudan). It has not experienced ethnic cleansing or ethnically based electoral violence (Kenya); it has not had to navigate the distance between military rule and an elected presidency (Uganda); it has not experienced violently repressive dictatorship (Zimbabwe ); and it has not experienced the utter political breakdown sometimes described as a “failed state” (Somalia). Tanzanians are aware that Tanzania is the non-Somalia, the non-Sudan, the non-Rwanda, and even the non-Kenya of Eastern Africa. Despite seemingly intractable problems of electoral irregularities , pervasive corruption, persistent poverty, and widening socioeconomic inequality, they appreciate their country’s tradition of civil peace. Tanzania’s economic achievement was its peaceful liberalization of the economy. In the decade from 1985 to 1995, the CCM transformed the country from a single-party socialist regime to a multiparty democracy presiding over a market-based economic system. The restructuring of the economy, which had the technical and financial support of IMF agreements, World Bank structural adjustment programs, and financial aid from bilateral donors and NGOs, did not provoke major episodes of political turbulence. Although it was an imperfect process, it did not launch urban riots or other mass protests among affected segments of its population. Tanzania has not experienced a version of the Arab Spring or even the Occupy Movement. Indeed, the country’s economic changes appear to enjoy the broad support of the Tanzanian people. Tanzania accomplished this transformation while allowing the country’s economic elite to consolidate control over the state. That outcome was the subtext of the grand bargain with the donors that resolved the 1994–1995 aid [18.189.170.17] Project MUSE (2024-04-16 14:11 GMT...

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