Ethnonationalist Conflict in Postcommunist States: Varieties of Governance in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Kosovo

Chapter 7. Continuity in Conflict Dynamics

Chapter 7 Continuity in Conflict Dynamics The major changes in the informally institutionalized conflict dynamics during the 2000s have now been outlined. Under pressure from insurgents and delegitimized majority policies, altering statehood became more acceptable to the international agents toward the end of the 1990s. This new attitude was conducive to the ‘‘replacement’’ of old rules of engagement between majorities, minorities, and international agents and the development of new ones. The 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement and the subsequent constitutional changes in Macedonia elevated the status of the Albanians, and further institutional reforms took place, including decentralization in local government. Although Kosovo remained officially under the international legal jurisdiction of Serbia, a new status quo emerged. The international agents also drastically changed their attitude toward longterm commitment to conflict resolution on the ground. The UNMIK governed in Kosovo, and local institutions were developed. The EU closely monitored the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia. Increased prospects for EU integration also contributed to change by ‘‘layering ’’ new EU rules on top of the existing ones, and by giving opportunities to local actors to develop practical attachments to them. These changes were large scale, but they did not overturn the informally institutionalized conflict dynamics in their entirety. As shown in Figure 11 in Chapter 6, specific outcomes continued: ‘‘nonviolent’’ and ‘‘threatened’’ in Bulgaria, ‘‘threatened’’ and ‘‘episodic’’ in Macedonia, and ‘‘extensive’’ and ‘‘episodic’’ in Kosovo. The aim here is to analyze how residual aspects of the established con- flict dynamics continued to operate and contribute to conflict perpetuation during the 2000s. Several questions are considered. How does existing Continuity in Conflict Dynamics 179 scholarship explain the perpetuation of existing conflicts? How do majorities , minorities, the international community, kin-states, and diasporas alter or perpetuate established conflict dynamics? What mechanisms lead to con- flict perpetuation? I argue that three critical factors continued to incentivize violence. • Large-scale corruption anchored in minority co-optation and coercion mechanisms of the previous period sustained stability between majorities, minorities, and often the international community . The ‘‘normalization of corruption’’ became a focal point for attacks by agents external to the corrupt political order or who had benefited little from it. They adopted strong anti-corruption claims and attacked minorities and other agents in the process, contributing to low levels of violence. • Lessons were ‘‘learned’’ from the international community that democratization could be neglected in favor of security and stability concerns.1 • Clandestine and often disputed influences remained from kinstates and diasporas, and were sustained by the continuation of adaptation mechanisms. The causal mechanisms of conflict perpetuation identified here are ‘‘drift’’ in combination with a ‘‘reactive sequence,’’ ‘‘learning,’’ and ‘‘adaptive expectations.’’ This chapter briefly surveys two clusters of scholarship that seek to explain why ethnonationalist conflicts persist even after strong international commitments to conflict resolution and democratization. I show how the path-dependence perspective adds to this discussion, engage the abovementioned residual aspects of conflict dynamics, and relate my findings to the literature on conflict perpetuation. Alternative Explanations to the Durability of Conflicts Two streams of thought on peace building and power sharing are relevant here to explain why conflicts endure. Scholarship on peace building considers that the immediate aftermath of civil wars creates obstacles to longterm conflict resolution and democratization. ‘‘Spoilers’’ can undermine 180 Chapter 7 peace processes by using violence if peace agreements leave them out of the bargaining process. Even if they are included, spoilers can still fail to implement the agreements and slide the polity back into civil war.2 Failure to provide adequate external security guarantees to disarm and demobilize soldiers can also be a problem.3 Walter considers 500 or more troops an adequate security guarantee, but in some cases larger numbers of troops have failed to be effective.4 Trying to implement liberal economic and democratic reforms in a short time span can undermine existing institutions and create competition among elites that ends in violence.5 The need to start a process of political development quickly can turn rushed founding elections into ‘‘a contest between former warring armies masquerading as political parties.’’6 Further barriers to implementation of peace agreements include lack of coordination between mediators and implementers and, among the implementing agencies, incomplete fulfillment of mandated tasks, short time horizons, and a limited commitment of implementers.7 This...