Multilevel Citizenship

Notes

Notes Chapter 1 Let me repeat the acknowledgments from the preface and in particular thank again the other authors for a wonderfully stimulating experience, from initial planning to final editing. Of all those who provided feedback on this chapter, let me mention Meng-Hsuan Chou and Ian Cooper for special thanks. Let me also again gratefully acknowledge support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Standard Research Grant 410-2010-2588, ‘‘Comparative Politics of Citizenship and Nationality’’), the German Academic Exchange Service—Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst, DAAD (a grant for ‘‘Migration and integration in Germany and the European Union’’), and the European Union Centre of Excellence at York University, funded by the European Commission. 1. The English word citizen comes not from nation-states but from cities, the Old French citeain, and before that, the Latin cı̄vitātānum, as seen also in other Romance languages: an inhabitant of a city or (often) of a town, especially one possessing civic rights and privileges. The Oxford English Dictionary further notes that the Latin cı̄vitās was the noun form of the condition of being cı̄vis, a citizen. Its primary sense was therefore citizenship (specifically, ‘‘the body of citizens, the community’’), and only in later times was the word taken as the town or place occupied by the community. The historical relation between the Roman cı̄vitās and cı̄vis was thus the reverse of that between the English city and citizen. 2. Leaving aside the question of the degree of sovereignty that states actually exercise ; see Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 12 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Following the tripartite development described by T. H. Marshall , one can say there is near-unanimous consensus that citizenship should mean equal civil rights for all citizens, strong but not unanimous consensus that all citizens should have the same political rights, and less consensus that citizenship implies equal social rights. The proper content and extent of each of these categories of rights is also contested, particularly those of newer or less settled social rights. T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950). 216 Notes to Pages 2–4 3. Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation : Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 28. 4. For example, the notion of an overarching European Union citizenship is jarring as long as EU member states continue to exist as states and the EU itself is not a state. See Willem Maas, Creating European Citizens (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Little- field, 2007), 2. 5. Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge , MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 72. 6. Indeed the very concept of international law reflects the priorities of states; after all, it is not transnational law or global law or any other version of non-state law; and the recognized parties under international law are states, although Chapter 10 in this book argues that businesses are starting to play a large role and Chapter 7 argues that Indigenous peoples are also starting to play a role in determining the development of international law. 7. Michael Walzer, ‘‘Response to Chaney and Lichtenberg,’’ in Boundaries: National Autonomy and Its Limits, ed. Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1981), 101, and David Miller, Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). 8. There is no space, nor is it the role of this chapter, to add to the voluminous literature on nationalism. For an overview of some recent work, see Willem Maas, ‘‘Emerging Themes and Issues in Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Migration Research,’’ in The International Studies Encyclopedia, ed. Robert A. Denemark (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010), 1348–1359. For a recent argument that rights to territory ‘‘belong in the first place to peoples and not to the states that represent them’’ and the conclusion that ‘‘the idea that states may claim and exercise the full set of territorial rights as representatives of the peoples they govern appears sound,’’ see David Miller, ‘‘Territorial Rights: Concept and Justification,’’ Political Studies 60, no. 2 (2012): 265, 266. 9. See, for example, Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) and David J. Elkins, Beyond Sovereignty: Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty-First Century (Toronto: University of...