Representation: Elections and Beyond

Chapter 8. A Democratic Balance: Bureaucracy, Political Parties, and Political Representation

CHAPTER 8 A Democratic Balance: Bureaucracy, Political Parties, and Political Representation Pradeep Chhibber and Susan L. Ostermann Political representation is experiencing an intellectual renaissance. A spate of new work (Manin 1997; Mansbridge 2003; Rehfeld 2006; Urbinati 2000, 2006; Urbinati and Warren 2008; Warren 2008; Williams 1998) has generated renewed interest in political representation—an idea that had been virtually silenced after Pitkin’s (1967) masterful treatment of the subject in The Concept of Representation. In this paper we focus on political representation in electoral democracies and make one claim—that political representation may not be possible in the absence of a well-functioning and well-disciplined bureaucracy. We argue that a voter is represented by her elected representative when there is an institutionalized policy relationship between the state and the voter—or, a bureaucracy that fairly implements the political decisions authorized by voters. In states where the bureaucracy is corrupt, politicized, or virtually nonexistent, effective representation of voters’ interests is unlikely . Political representation, therefore, requires not only a mechanism for electing representatives, but also parties whose organizations have mechanisms for advocacy of voters’ interests, and a government that can successfully institutionalize voter interests once they are turned into laws or policies. A Democratic Balance 167 Why are we focusing our attention only on political representation in representative democracies? We stress this particular relationship since free and fair elections are equated with representative democracy. If the claims in this chapter hold up, we may be faced with a distinctly uncomfortable theoretical possibility—that electoral democracy need not be representative . The first part of the paper isolates authorization, sympathy (either as advocacy and/or stand-in representation), and accountability as the three main features that define political representation. Formally (and consistent with the claims of polyarchy), voting is supposed to ensure such representation , especially authorization and accountability. If, however, we ask why a voter votes the way she does, we need to articulate what constitutes a sympathetic relationship between a voter and her representative. Such an articulation leads to the conclusion that minimal notions of democracy are not truly representative and, hence, devoid of any real political content. The development of this sympathetic relationship between the voter and her representative , we argue, is only possible when the interests of the represented to the representative are (effectively) institutionalized within the state. The second part of the chapter discusses the social cleavage theory of party systems. Only those social groups whose interests are institutionalized within a state can successfully be represented by a party system. In the third section we introduce, with thanks to Ahuja and Chhibber (2012), the notion of a capricious state—a state in which ad hoc and arbitrary policy implementation is the norm. A capricious state undermines political representation . We claim that in capricious states the norm is not political representation but selective political representation—a form of representation that results in a voter seeing the political process as representing someone else’s interests, not hers. A capricious state severs the self-interested tie of a voter to her representative. The fourth section provides evidence from India where—despite fifty years of elections—a capricious state has undermined political representation. We provide evidence for the capricious state and show that these conditions lead citizens to see the state as selectively representative. Consequently, the links between social divisions and the party system are weak and fragile. We then provide evidence that where the bureaucracy is doing its job and parties are not the tools of individual politicians, political representation is possible. We also suggest a mechanism which may be responsible for the 168 Pradeep Chhibber and Susan L. Ostermann failure of many Indian politicians to discipline the bureaucracy and ensure the type of representation their voters demand. Finally, we conclude with some implications and caveats. The Vote, Political Representation, and Minimal Theories of Democracy Without prejudice to the various claims and counter-claims about whether political representation is a coherent concept, a consensus exists that political representation in a democracy (an institutional arrangement in which some group of voters elects a representative) entails authorization; a sympathetic relationship between voters and their representatives (either as advocacy and/or as stand-in representation); and accountability (Urbinati and Warren 2008; Rehfeld 2006). Urbinati (2000) states this succinctly when she observes that, for political representation to exist, “a constituency must authorize a person (party) to represent them; that person (party) must act in...