Notes
NOTES Introduction 1. Jan Dehn, “The Effects on Growth of Commodity Price Uncertainty and Shocks,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2455 (2001). 2. This is based on the definition of energy security presented in Brenda Shaffer, Energy Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 93. In Energy Politics, the third component was referred to as environmental friendliness. The revised term environmental sustainability more accurately describes this factor. 3. Emirates Business 24/7, December 7, 2009. 4. BBC news, January 4, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8440181 .stm, accessed July 1, 2010. 5. Benjamin Smith, “Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999,” American Journal of Political Science 48:2 (April 2004): 232–46. 6. The 1973–74 boycott was called by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), the Arab group of states within OPEC. 7. GECF was founded in Tehran in 2001. In its official documents it declares, “The Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) is a gathering of the world’s leading gas producers aimed at representing and promoting their mutual interests. The GECF was set up with the objective to increase the level of coordination and strengthen the collaboration between member countries.” Member states are Algeria, Bolivia, Brunei, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. Kazakhstan, Netherlands, and Norway are observers. 8. Iran is a net importer of natural gas. It exports modest quantities of natural gas to Turkey and Armenia but imports larger quantities from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan . Chapter 1 The author would like to thank the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy in Baku and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University for support and Rabah Arezki, Sebastian Bustos, Oyebola Olabisi, Lant Pritchett, and Jesse Schreger for comments. 372 Notes to Pages 18–23 1. See Richard Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) and Richard Auty, Resource Abundance and Economic Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 2. See Paul Stevens, “Resource Impact: Curse or Blessing? A Literature Survey,” Journal of Energy Literature 9:1 (June 2003): 1–42 and Frederick van der Ploeg, “Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?” Journal of Economic Literature 49:2 (June 2011): 366–420. The surveys by Stevens and van der Ploeg are written for energy specialists and economic theorists, respectively. The present survey casts a wider net, is intended for a more general audience, and offers policy prescriptions. 3. See Raymond Mikesell, “Explaining the Resource Curse, with Special Reference to Mineral-Exporting Countries,” Resources Policy 23:4 (December 1997): 191– 99; Stevens, “Resource Impact: Curse or Blessing?”; Daniel Lederman and William Maloney, “In Search of the Missing Resource Curse,” Economia 9:1 (Fall 2008); Gavin Wright and Jesse Czelusta, “Mineral Resources and Economic Development,” Conference on Sector Reform in Latin America, Stanford Center for International Development , November 13–15, 2003; Gavin Wright and Jesse Czelusta, “The Myth of the Resource Curse,” Challenge 47 (March–April 2004); Gavin Wright and Jesse Czelusta, “Resource-Based Growth Past and Present,” in Daniel Lederman and William F. Maloney , eds., Neither Curse Nor Destiny: Natural Resources and Development (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press and World Bank, 2006); Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and van der Ploeg, “Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?” 4. If OPEC functioned effectively as a true cartel, then it would possess even more monopoly power in the aggregate. We assume here, however, that OPEC does not currently exercise much monopoly power beyond that of Saudi Arabia, because so many nonmembers now produce oil and because even OPEC members usually do not feel constrained to stay within assigned quotas. 5. See Raul Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems (New York: UN Department of Economic Affairs, 1950) and Hans W. Singer, “U.S. Foreign Investment in Underdeveloped Areas: The Distribution of Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 40 (May 1950): 473–85. 6. Insecure ownership rights are seen to inhibit investment in natural resources in Henning Bohn and Robert Deacon, “Ownership Risk, Investment, and the Use of Natural Resources,” American Economic Review 90 (June 2000): 526–49. 7. See Harold Hotelling, “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources,” Journal of Political Economy 39:2 (April 1931): 137–75. 8. The same arbitrage condition that implies a positive long-run price trend...
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